More cases against OpenAI over injuries arguably caused by ChatGPT use; and a comment on why recognizing such claims would be bad policy

 The number of claims against OpenAI related to injuries alleged to have been caused by the use of ChatGPT continues to rise.  For two stories on this I posted recently go here and here.  Here are the latest stories I have seen:

Family of FSU shooting victim sues OpenAI over suspect’s ChatGPT use (The Hill 5/11/26)

Parents accuse ChatGPT of assisting in son’s drug-induced death (ABA Journal 5/13/26)

For some commentary on these types of claims, you should take a look at this article:  "More Liability Will Make AI Chatbots Worse At Preventing Suicide" (TechDirt, 5/6/26)

Washington Court allows claim against Amazon based on plaintiffs' decedent's suicide -- UPDATED

February 22, 2026

 Long time readers of this blog may remember that I have posted a number of times about cases dealing with whether Amazon can (or should) be considered a "seller" for purposes of product liability law.  (Go here and scroll down.)

The most recent of those cases involved that claims of the families of three teenagers and a young adult who died after ingesting sodium nitrite purchased on Amazon. The trial judge denied a motion to dismiss the complaint but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plaintiffs could not support the element of duty because the decedents had intentionally misused the product.

I am writing about this today because earlier this week, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reversed holding that the plaintiffs could continue to pursue their claim against Amazon.  You can read more about the case in Courthouse News Service, and you can read the decision of the court here.

In deciding the case, the court rejected the so-called "suicide rule" which is still in place in many jurisdictions and according to which the act of suicide is, as a matter of law, a superseding cause that defeats the cause of action.  The court's rejection of this rule follows a recent ruling in Nevada and what appears to be a new trend on the issue. Go here for more on that story.

UPDATE (3-12-26):  Courthouse News Service has a story on the case here.

Yet another lawsuit filed against ChatGPT for its alleged role in a user's suicide

 Since August of last year I have seen several cases filed in different jurisdictions against AI platforms alleging in one way or another that the platform contributed to a person's decision to commit suicide.  See here, and here.  I also reported on the fact that Nevada decided to abandon the so-called "suicide rule" which will make it less difficult to support a prima face case for injuries caused by suicide.  See here.

So, today I am reporting on yet another case filed against ChatGPT.  In this one, the mother of a man who killed himself after conversing with the chatbot is suing the generative artificial intelligence company OpenAI and its CEO and founder, Sam Altman. According to the article, the mother alleges that the AI platform coached her son into suicide, even while he told ChatGPT that he did not want to die.

You can read more about this case here.

Another lawsuit filed against makers of ChatGPT based on the AI platform's alleged role in a suicide

 I recently posted a comment on a case filed by the parents of a minor suing the makers of ChatGPT alleging that the AI platform helped their son commit suicide (see here).

Now comes news that a similar lawsuit has been filed in California.  In this one, in its capacity as executor to a deceased woman, a bank filed the claim against the maker of ChatGPT arguing that the platform was responsible for inducing a mentally unstable son to kill his elderly mother and then commit suicide.

Courthouse News Service has the full story here, and NPR has a brif audio commentary here.

Nevada Supreme Court abandons "suicide rule" and adopts proximate cause analysis for all suicide cases

 Long time readers of this blog may remember I have often posted about cases involving claims for wrongful death arising out of someone’s suicide.  (See here.)  These are always difficult cases, not only because of the underlying circumstances surrounding the death but also because, as you probably know, the prevailing approach to the issue is that suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law.

Yet, I have noticed in recent years more courts are coming around to the view that this so-called “suicide rule” should be abandoned – a position I happen to agree with.  See my comments on cases from Tennessee, Arizona, Alabama and Illinois, for example.

So, today I am writing about this topic again, because the Supreme Court of Nevada just issued an opinion doing away with the suicide rule in a very well written opinion in a case called Bourne v. Valdes,  569 P.3d 971 (Nev. 2025).  As the court explained:

We conclude that a patient’s suicide does not preclude liability for medical malpractice as a matter of law.  Rather, like any other action alleging that a medical provider’s negligence caused injury or death to a patient, the ordinary principles of medical malpractice apply.  Consistent with existing Nevada medical malpractice law, a medical provider who is alleged to have provided negligent care to a patient owes a duty of care to that patient, regardless of whether the medical provider has control over, or custody of, the patient.  If the medical provider’s conduct is proven to fall below the standard of care, then “the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant’s negligent conduct led to or made it reasonably foreseeable that the deceased would commit suicide.” White v.  Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn.  1998).  If the patient’s suicide is a foreseeable consequence of the medical provider’s negligence, then the medical provider may be held liable.  See Patricia C.  Kussmann, Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist, or Psychologist for Failure to Take Steps to Prevent Patient’s Suicide, 81 ALR 5th 167, § 4 (2000) . . .  However, where the patient’s suicide is not foreseeable, then the suicide is a superseding intervening cause, severing the causal chain and relieving the medical provider of liability for their negligence.  White, 975 S.W.2d at 530.  

I agree that this is the correct analysis that should be applied. Suicide is sometimes unforeseeable, but often it is foreseeable and plaintiffs should have the chance to prove it.  The notion that suicide should be considred to be unforeseeable as a matter of law is based on the notion that committing suicide goes so against human nature that it is inconceivable that someone would decide to do so.  The problem with this is that this view is not realistic.  Suicide is common.  In fact, it is one of the top leading causes of death among juveniles in the US.  And, if you take into account mental health issues, and known medication side effects, it is unrealistic to say that suicide is necessarily unforeseeable.  In many cases, it can fairly be argued (and proven) that it was totally foreseeable.

Parents sue ChatGPT Company alleging the AI program helped their son commit suicide

 The parents of a 16-year-old who died by suicide sued OpenAI last week, claiming that ChatGPT encouraged their son to take his life and even provided detailed instructions on how to do so.  

Above the Law has a good comment on the issues raised by the case here.  On the one hand, it points out that "[w]hile the complaint criticizes ChatGPT for answering Raine’s questions about the technical aspects of various suicide methods, these read like simple search queries that he could’ve found through non-AI research. They’re also questions that someone could easily ask because they’re writing a mystery novel, so it’s hard to make the case that OpenAI had an obligation to prevent the bot from providing these answers. The fact that ChatGPT explained how nooses work will get a lot of media attention, but it seems like a red herring because it’s hard to imagine imposing a duty on OpenAI to not answer technical questions."

On the other hand, it discusses how troubling the AI's conversations about the child's actual intent to take his own life.  You should read the comment to see the details.

Courthouse News Service has more on the story here.

This is an interesting case, and it is worth keeping an eye on, but the first obstacle the plaintiffs will have to deal with is the fact that the defendant will likely argue that they can't meet the element of proximate cause because suicide is usually considered to be a superseding cause.

Comment on the recent case on whether a suicide is an unforeseeable intervening event

 A few days ago I reported (here) that the Illinois Appellate Court recently decided a case on whether a decedent’s conduct in committing suicide constitutes a superseding cause that defeats a plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful death.  The case is called O’Donnell v. Bailey & Associates Counseling.  

I mentioned that I was interested in the subject because Illinois is one of those states that has decided in the past that a suicide is an unforeseeable, and therefore superseding, intervening cause “as a matter of law.”  I finally had a chance to read the opinion, and, oh my!  What a mess!

If you want a course on how to make something much more difficult and confusing than it needs to be read this case and, more importantly, the state supreme court's cases it cites.  By working through a word salad based on statements about “general rules” that apply “as a matter of law” but that end up having exceptions, which means they should not always apply a matter of law, and ignoring basic rules of tort law, in the end the court manages to decide the case by going against the language of precedent cases, while stating that it is following precedent, which is actually correct, because the precedent cases do not say what the court has been saying they said since they were decided.  

Did you get all that?  Let’s see if we can figure it out.  And let’s start at the very beginning.

As you probably know, the prevailing approach to the issue of proximate cause is the so-called scope of the risk analysis (adopted by the Restatement) the main ingredient of which is the notion of foreseeability.  According to this analysis, a defendant’s conduct is a proximate cause of the injury if the injury is a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent conduct.  But you also probably know that this long version of the analysis is usually shortened to simply asking whether the injury is foreseeable.  If the plaintiff can convince that the injury is foreseeable given the conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff will meet the element of proximate cause.

Now, the defendant, of course, can then argue that the injury is not foreseeable and one way to do that is to argue that an intervening event which was not foreseeable interrupted, and broke, the chain of causation.  Thus, if the defendant can convince that the intervening event was not foreseeable, the defendant will be able to say that the plaintiff can’t establish the element of proximate cause.

This is the basic tort law principle at issue in suicide cases.  In an attempt to defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the defendant will always argue that the conduct of the decedent, ie, committing suicide, was unforeseeable.  

Now here is where things start to get complicated.  Usually, what is or is not foreseeable is a matter of fact to be decided by the jury, but a number of jurisdictions have held that a suicide is unforeseeable “as a matter of law.”  

This conclusion is based on the notion that committing suicide goes so against human nature that it is inconceivable that someone would decide to do so and therefore it should always be thought of as unforeseeable.  The problem with this is that this view is not realistic.  Suicide is common.  In fact, it is one of the top leading causes of death among juveniles in the US.  And, if you take into account mental health issues, and known medication side effects, it is unrealistic to say that suicide is necessarily unforeseeable.  In many cases, it can fairly be argued (and proven) that it was totally foreseeable.

Now let’s talk about the state of the law in Illinois.  

In Illinois, the Supreme Court decided long ago that a suicide is unforeseeable “as a matter of law.”  Yet, in 2015, it decided a case called Turcios v. DeBruler Co. in which, probably without realizing it, the court twisted the analysis into such a pretzel that it ended up exactly where it said it wouldn’t.  I wrote about this back when the case was decided and you can read my comment here, but let me repeat the basics.

In Turcios, the court reiterated its precedent position that a suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law, but then referred to that position as “the general rule” and recognized the possibility that a plaintiff could support a claim if the plaintiff could “plead facts demonstrating that the suicide was foreseeable, i.e., that it was a likely result of the defendant’s conduct.”

Hmm.  Does that sound familiar?  If not, go up an re-read the paragraphs where I explain the basic tort law principle of proximate cause.  

What does this mean?  It means that in 2015, the court, for all practical purposes abandoned the position that a suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law and changed its approach to asking whether the suicide is a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the conduct of the defendant.  

And what is that if not simply saying what we know from Torts 101: that knowing the defendant will argue that the intervening event (the suicide) was unforeseeable, the plaintiff will have to argue and prove that the intervening event was foreseeable.  

Given this decision, it makes no sense to continue to say that a suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law.  But the court keeps doing it; and tries to make sense of it by claiming that that is “the general rule” but that there are exceptions to the general rule.  That contradicts its decisions, and more importantly, its logic.  It makes no sense.

Enter the new case, decided just a few days ago, which makes everything even more confusing but oddly reaches the correct result.

In this case, the Appellate Court discusses the possibility of imposing liability on a medical professional for alleged negligent conduct toward an outpatient who later committed suicide.  The plaintiffs, as you would expect, argued that the defendant’s conduct resulted in the decedent’s death and the defendant argued that the act of committing suicide was an unforeseeable and, therefore, superseding cause.  

Following precedent, the lower court dismissed the claim holding that the suicide was unforeseeable as a matter of law.  But the Appellate Court then reversed, once again contradicting the supposed precedent - but which makes sense now that we understand that precedent was abandoned (only the Supreme Court did not really say so when it happened).

This result, on the one hand, adds to the confusion about the issue.  Yet, on the other hand, the good news is that the Appellate Court actually used the correct analysis and reached the correct result.  It found that a suicide is not necessarily unforeseeable as a matter of law and, refuting an argument by the defendant, that it does not matter whether the decedent was a patient or an outpatient.  

Citing approvingly a number of decisions from other jurisdictions, the court agreed with one of them in that “[i]f those who are caring for and treating mentally disturbed patients know of facts from which they could reasonably conclude that the patients would be likely to inflict harm on themselves in the absence of preventative measures, then those caretakers must use reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent such harm from occurring.” 

However, the full analysis should be much more simple than the explanation given by the court (and the Supreme Court’s precedent cases).  First, the plaintiff has the burden to show proximate cause, and if the defendant argues that an intervening event is superseding, the court must determine whether that intervening event is foreseeable.  And, second, if the alleged intervening event is a suicide, it must be determined if that unfortunate event was foreseeable under the circumstances, which is not a question decided “as a matter of law.”

Now we sit and wait to see if the case will be appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.  If it is, let’s hope the Court admits that the state of the law is a mess and takes the chance to clean it up.  Given the mess they have created up to this point, I am not too hopeful, but we’ll see.  It is a new year and maybe good things will come.

IL Appellate Court Holds that Mental Health Providers Can Be Liable for the Suicide of Outpatient Mental Health Clients

 The TortsProf Blog recently reported that the Illinois Appellate Court decided a case holding that a mental health professional can be liable for the suicide of an outpatient.  This is an interesting development because Illinois has decided in the past suicide is an unforeseeable intervening (and therefore superseding) cause as a matter of law.  I am interested in reading how the court distinguishes this case from those precedents.  The case is called O’Donnell v. Bailey & Assocs. Counseling, and you can search for it with this cite:  2023 IL App (1st) 221736.

Parents of teen who committed suicide sue Snapchat and other "apps" developers

A few days ago I posted a news story about a decision against Snapchat.  Yesterday, I posted a story about a new decision involving a suicide.  Tragically, today's story combines both themes.

Law & Crime is reporting that the mother of a teenager who took his own life after months of online harassment is suing Snapchat and the makers of third-party anonymous messaging apps YOLO and LMK, alleging that the products violated consumer protection laws by failing to comply with their own terms of service that promise safeguards against cyberbullying.

You can read more on the story and the complaint itself here.

Court in Alabama holds suicide is not a superseding cause

In many other jurisdictions, a decedent's conduct in committing suicide is considered a superseding cause, presumably based on the notion that it is always unforeseeable that someone would commit suicide. 

But we all know that this statement is simply not true.  Depending on the circumstances, whether someone might commit suicide is as foreseeable as any other intervening event.  And, for that reason, it is not convincing to hold as a matter of law that suicide is always unforeseeable.  Yet, that is what many courts do.

I am writing about this today because I just read in Courthouse News that an appeals court in Alabama recently ruled that a man accused of sexually assaulting a college student who later killed herself can be sued for wrongful death, finding that suicide arising from an alleged sexual assault does not “absolve the alleged assailant of liability.”

The case is Rondini v. Bunn and you can read the decision here.

Federal court rules that parents of a third grader who committed suicide have a cause of action against school board and school principal

 In a case that has a number of interesting implications the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss in a case involving the suicide of a young boy due to bullying in school.

The case involves a third grader who committed suicide after allegedly being the victim of multiple bullying incidents over a couple of years.  According to the complaint, school officials either downplayed the severity of incidents or flat out refused to notify them. Also, despite surveillance footage of the most recent incident, the school's principal and vice principal misrepresented the nature of Taye’s injuries to the boys parents.  

The parents sued the school board, and the principal and vice principal in their personal capacities.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the lower court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The case is interesting for a number of reasons.  First, there is the question of whether state immunity should protect the defendants.  

Second, there is the question of proximate cause.  Most often courts find that suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause that severs the chain of causation preventing plaintiffs from supporting proximate cause.  However, in this case the court found that the boy’s suicide was plainly foreseeable, especially considering the school’s guidelines on bullying include suicide as a risk.

As I am sure you remember the prevailing test for proximate cause is to ask whether the injury is a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent conduct.  If the school guidelines actually mention suicide as a risk, it will be very difficult for the defendants to say that it was an unforeseeable consequence.

The case is called Myers v. Cincinnati Board of Education and you can find a copy here.

For more information on the case you can read stories in Law & Crime, and Courthouse News.

Germany's highest court declares law banning assisted suicide is unconstitutional

Germany’s highest court on Wednesday ruled that a 2015 law banning professional assisted suicide was unconstitutional, as it robbed terminally ill patients of “the right to a self-determined death.”

Courthouse News Service has more details here.

Alabama Supreme Court to decide whether suicide is a superseding cause

Long time readers of this blog know that I have posted many stories on issues related to claims of injuries related to suicide; and one of the most common issues is the question of whether someone's decision to commit suicide should be considered to be a superseding cause that eliminates the possible cause of action against a defendant whose alleged conduct resulted in the suicide.  I recently wrote about this here (discussing Arizona law) and here (Tennessee law).

The issue is now back in the news because a federal court in Alabama recently ruled that a tort case brought by the parents of a woman who killed herself against the man she said sexually assaulted her should be stayed pending the Alabama Supreme Court’s answer of whether suicide is an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation stemming from a defendant’s intentional tort.  The court's decision is available here.

For all my posts related to suicide cases, go here and scroll down.

Arizona Appeals Court suggests it is time to starting thinking of suicide as any other intervening cause

As in many other jurisdictions, a decedent's conduct in committing suicide is considered a superseding cause, presumably based on the notion that it is always unforeseeable that someone would commit suicide. 

But we all know that this statement is nonsense.  That someone might commit suicide is as foreseeable as any other intervening event.  Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't.  And, for that reason, it is not convincing to hold as a matter of law that suicide is always unforeseeable.  Yet, that is what many courts do.

I am writing about this today because I just read in Bloomberg news that an Arizona appeals court recently dismissed a legal malpractice suit against two law firms brought by the parents of a woman who killed herself.  The court cited that accepted view of suicide as a superseding cause as the reason for its ruling, but urged the state supreme court to revisit “the aging majority rule” because it’s “primitive and unduly inflexible."

I agree, particularly given the statistics about suicide in this country, that as the court stated, the suicide rule is outdated, noting that it “draws from society’s historical view of suicide as sinful and immoral.”  The court's opinion states in fact that it "would not adopt the majority rule if it were within the scope of our authority to make that decision.”

The case is called Parton v. Jeans.

Recent developments on whether colleges and universities have a duty to protect students from harm -- UPDATED

August

Last year I published an article on whether colleges or universities have a duty to protect students from harm (available here).  In it I discussed the then most recent cases on the subject.  One involved a claim against a university based on an attack by one student on another.  The other case involved a student who committed suicide.  In both cases, the courts found that the institution owed a limited duty of care to protect the students, which was a hint of the beginning of a new trend on the issue.

I am writing about this today because, sadly, there are two recent stories that combine both types of cases.

The first story involves the the death of a 24-year-old Ph.D. student of Chinese and Indian heritage at Utah State University.  According to a complaint filed recently, she ended her life after eight months of racist bullying by classmates.  The complaint names as defendants Utah State University, the head of the psychology department, and some students and professors, and it alleges negligence, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The claim against the University and its employees is based on the allegation that the decedent  complained about the alleged bullying to professors and a department chairperson but that the University took no action.

This claim is similar to the one filed in the case I discussed in my article so it will be interesting to see if the courts continue the trend to recognize, and impose, more of a duty to protect.  The one significant difference between the two cases however is that Utah State University is a state actor and, therefore, may be protected by immunity under a state "torts claims act" type statute.

You can read more about the case here.

A second related item involves  a Missouri college student who allegedly was “fascinated” with death and gave five other students advice on how to commit suicide. The student is now being sued by parents of two of the students who killed themselves, along with the University the students attended and the Fraternity they belonged to.  However, from the news account it is not too clear how strong the connection between the conduct of the student and the alleged conduct of the university really is.

You can read more about this case here.

For my posts on cases involving suicide, including some cases involving claims against colleges and universities, or against students for hazing, go here and scroll down.


UPDATE 11/3/19:  CBS has an article on the case here.

Recent Tennessee case holds suicide is a superseding cause

A couple of days ago I posted a comment about a couple of recent claims based on deaths by suicide.  Sadly suicide is a serious health issue.  There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenth-leading cause of death in the country, which raises an interesting question for courts:  if the risk of suicide is known, can it be said that someone committing suicide is always unforeseeable?

I have published many stories on the issues raised by claims based on suicide over the years.  You can go here and scroll down to read them.  In a recent one I commented on an article that argues it is time to change the way courts approach suicide as a superseding cause that eliminates the right of a plaintiff to recovery -- a view I happen to agree with.

I am writing about this today because I just read about a new opinion out of Tennessee that provides the most recent and fairly comprehensive discussion on whether the act of committing suicide should be considered to be a superseding cause.  The case is called Cotten v. Wilson and you can read the opinion here.

As you may know already, some jurisdictions consider suicide a superseding cause per se, in all cases, while others presume it is a superseding but would consider evidence to support the claim that the presumption should be defeated.

Tennessee appears to be in the second camp.  According to the case, courts in Tennessee have generally held that suicide will be deemed a superseding cause of death if it was ‘a willful, calculated, and deliberate act of one who has the power of choice based on the notion that no reasonable person could foresee that a rational person would intentionally choose to commit suicide. But, courts would consider the conduct foreseeable under different circumstances including (1) where it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct will cause a mental condition in the decedent that would lead to the self-destructive act, (2) where the suicide occurs in a custodial context, (3) where there was a special relationship between the defendant and decedent, and (4) situations in which the defendant facilitated the suicide by supplying the decedent with the means to carry it out.

The case involved a woman and a psychiatrist who had been in a relationship.  The psychiatrist knew that the woman had attempted to commit suicide in the past, but nevertheless allowed her to stay in his home alone with an unsecured gun.

It seems to me that it is not too far fetched to argue that suicide could be considered to be foreseeable under those circumstances.  Yet, the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the claim holding that the “suicide constitutes a superseding intervening event that breaks the chain of proximate causation.”  One judge filed a dissenting opinion, which you can read here.

Article proposing changes to the view that suicide is a superseding cause

As you may know, courts often rule that a person's decision to commit suicide operates as a superseding cause which results in dismissing wrongful death claims against defendants whose conduct allegedly drove the decedent to commit suicide.

A few years ago, I commented how this approach to the issue has resulted in a confused state of the law in Illinois.  See here.    I have also argued that the analysis has never made much sense to me because, by definition, a superseding cause is superseding only if it is unforeseeable and suicide is not always unforeseeable. 

However, for some, the act of committing suicide is still so inconceivable that for them it should always be considered to be unforeseeable.  Perhaps this is based on the notion that life, however bad it might be, is always preferable to death, and therefore it is inconceivable that someone might prefer to die.  This categorical approach, however, fails to consider the many possible reasons and circumstances that might lead someone to consider suicide.

Thus I have argued that the analysis in suicide cases should be exactly the same as that in all other cases that involve intervening causes:  is the injury a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent conduct?  Two years ago, I reported on a case that agreed with my view.  See here.

I am writing about this today because I just saw a new article on the subject.  It is called  Abolishing the Suicide Rule, and here is the abstract:

Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue. There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenth-leading cause of death in the country. But societal attitudes on the subject remain decidedly mixed. Suicide is often closely linked to mental illness, a condition that continues to involve stigma and often triggers irrational fears and misunderstanding. For many, suicide remains an immoral act that flies in the face of strongly held religious principles. In some ways, tort law’s treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting societal views regarding suicide. Tort law has long been reluctant to permit recovery in a wrongful death action from a defendant who is alleged to have caused the suicide of the decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict rule of causation in suicide cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide rule” in one jurisdiction. While reluctance to assign liability to defendants whose actions are alleged to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm in negligence cases, there has been a slight trend among court decisions away from singling out suicide cases for special treatment and toward an analytical framework that more closely follows traditional tort law principles. This Article argues that this trend is to be encouraged and that it is time for courts to largely abandon the special rules that have developed in suicide cases that treat suicide as a superseding cause of a decedent’s death.

You can find the full article in SSRN, here.

Lawsuit Blames Sorority Hazing for Athlete's Suicide

I recently published a short article on two recent cases on whether universities have a "duty to help" students by preventing injuries caused by other students or by protecting students from injuring themselves (including by attempting to commit suicide).  You can read it here.

With this in mind, I found it interesting to read that FindLaw is reporting that the mother of a Northwestern University basketball player that took her own life in early 2017 has filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois court alleging that Jordan's sorority's hazing motivated her suicide.

I have not seen the complaint itself so I am not sure of the details, but from the stories I have read in the press, it appears the lawsuit is against the sorority and not against the University.

Massachusetts and California rule universities have a limited duty to help students because of special relationship

As readers of this blog know, the general common law did not recognize a duty to help or to control the conduct of others.  However, over time, courts (and eventually the Restatement) recognized limited duties in certain circumstances.  One of the most commonly accepted of these exceptions to the general rule is based on the existence of a special relationship.

Traditionally, a special relationship exists when a person is dependent on the other for safety.  Whether a relationship constitutes a special relationship which creates a duty to help, or protect, has usually been interpreted narrowly and for a long time was limited to the relationship between common carriers and their passengers and innkeepers and their guests.  However, some jurisdictions (and the Restatement) have considered extending the notion of special relationships to include other circumstances including the relationships between landlords and tenants, and commercial establishments and their customers.

As you would expect, whether schools have a special relationship with their students is a common question.  Because of the types of schools and ages of the students, the analysis is different if the case involves elementary schools or high schools, as opposed to colleges and universities.

There are lots of cases out there related to injuries suffered by students in college campuses, but not all jurisdictions have decided whether the schools have a duty to help or protect the students based on the relationship between the school and the student.

You may remember from your law school days a case called Hegel v Langsam used by many textbooks to illustrate the generally accepted rule that universities do not have a general duty to protect students.  Yet, according to some, there seems to be a trend to recognize (or impose) a duty in recent times.

Now we can add Massachusetts and California to the list of states that have decided the issue in favor of imposing a limited duty on the university.

Last December I wrote about a case brought against MIT that asked whether the university should be held responsible in a wrongful death claim based on the fact that a student took his own lives.  You can read my initial comments about the case here.

The student’s family sued, claiming his death was preventable and that the school had a legal duty to use reasonable care to protect him from harm.  MIT replied that the school wasn’t aware of the severity of the student’s condition and that he was treated by outside professionals, none of whom thought the student was a risk to himself.

I just read that the Supreme Court of Massachusetts issued its opinion yesterday.  I have not read the opinion itself, so I can't comment in detail but from what I have read, the court found that a university has a duty to take action if it is aware that a student has attempted, or has threatened, to commit suicide while enrolled at the university.  I do not know of any other cases that have found that universities have a duty to prevent suicides. 

Meanwhile, in California, the Supreme Court decided back in March, that colleges and universities are in a special relationship with their enrolled students which creates a limited duty to help, and protect, during school-sponsored activities over which the college has some measure of control.

The case is called The Regents of the Univ. of California v. Superior Court (decided March 22, 2018).  This one I have read and here is a summary:

The facts are long and detailed, but the short version of the story is that over more than a semester a certain UCLA student suffered from hallucinations and other mental health issues and behaved erratically and threateningly toward other students.  The problematic behavior was known to other students, TAs, professors, and members of the administration of the university.  The administration took action to help the students involved, including moving the problematic student off his dorm, and providing counseling.  The student was cooperative at times, but not consistently.  Sometimes he attended counseling, sometimes he did not.  Sometimes he took medication, sometimes he did not, and so on.

Again, there are more details to the story, but to make it short, one day at the end of class in a a science lab, the student unexpectedly and without provocation attacked another student (the plaintiff in the case) with a knife, causing her severe injuries.

The plaintiff sued the attacker and UCLA.  Against UCLA, she argued that the university owed her several duties:  (1) a duty to take reasonable protective measures to ensure her safety against violent attacks and otherwise protect her from reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct; (2) a duty to warn her as to such reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct on its campus and in its buildings; and, (3) a duty to control the reasonably foreseeable wrongful acts of third parties/other students.  In the alternative, she argued that even if UCLA did not owe those duties to her based on the special relationship, UCLA had assumed a duty of care by undertaking to provide campus-wide security.  (Because the court found that UCLA did owe a duty based on the special relationship, this last argument was not addressed.)

UCLA filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that colleges have no duty to protect their adult students from criminal acts but the Trial Court denied it.  On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeal reversed.  The dissenting judge opined that colleges have a special relationship with their enrolled students, “at least when the student is in a classroom under the direct supervision of an instructor” and that, therefore, colleges have duty to protect against foreseeable threats of violence in classroom.

The plaintiffs appealed and the state supreme court agreed with the dissenting judge holding that there is a duty to protect, although there is no duty to control.

The Court's opinion starts by reviewing the general rule and the exceptions to the notion of a duty to help.  Thus, the court is clear that there is no duty to help unless the plaintiff can establish that the defendant had a special relationship toward the plaintiff that justifies imposing a duty on the defendant.  Such a relationship would be characterized by dependency and control: one party depends on the other for protection and the other has the ability to provide control over that needed protection.  The court also explains even if there is a duty, the duty must be limited.  It can't be a duty owed to the public at large; it is owed only to those to whom the special relationship applies.

With this as the general background, the court compared the circumstances of the case to those of cases involving high schools because it has already been decided that high school do have a duty to protect students.

The court admitted that there are differences between high schools and colleges but decided the relationship between a university and its students still justifies finding that a duty is owed.

The cases involving high schools have held that there is duty owed because the relationship between the school and the students is characterized by mandatory character of school attendance and comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel.  Even though in the college setting, the students have more freedom and are usually not minors, the court found that students are still somewhat vulnerable because, although they are not minors, they are still learning how to navigate the world as adults and are, therefore, dependent on their college communities to provide structure, guidance, and a safe learning environment.

Given this conclusion, and the fact that colleges have superior control over the college community environment and the ability to protect students, including by monitoring and disciplining them if necessary, the court concluded that it is justified to find that colleges have a special relationship with their students.

However, the fact that there is a special relationship does not mean there is a duty to everyone or to eliminate all risks.  The court concluded that colleges are in a special relationship with their enrolled students only, and limited to the context of school-sponsored activities over which the college has some measure of control.  The court also noted that this duty is not a duty to prevent violence, which would be impossible to discharge.  It is a duty to take reasonable steps to protect students when the university becomes aware of a foreseeable threat to their safety.

Applying its conclusions to the facts of the case, the court remanded the case for the Court of Appeal to decide whether triable issues of material fact remain on the questions of breach of the duty (alerting to the fact that the appropriate standard of care for judging reasonableness of university’s actions remains an open question, which parties are free to litigate on remand.)

Thus, UCLA lost the argument on whether the court should impose a duty, but it is possible that UCLA will not be liable if it is determined that it did not breach the duty.

In a separate Concurring Opinion, one of the justices makes a very good point:  the language used by the court may be a bit too broad.

For a few reasons, this justice did not join the majority opinion insofar as it would extend the duty beyond the classroom, to encompass more broadly “curricular activities” and activities “closely related to [the] delivery of educational services.”   First, there is no need to decide if the duty extends beyond the classroom, because the attack in this case occurred in a classroom.  Second, the extent of a university’s control in a non-classroom setting varies considerably because activities outside the classroom differ in potentially significant ways. And, third, the majority’s conclusion can create confusion because it offers no guidance as to which non-classroom activities qualify as either “curricular” or “closely related to [the] delivery of educational services” or what factors are relevant to this determination.

Should a school be liable if a student commits suicide?

A student’s suicide at MIT has sparked a contentious legal battle before the Massachusetts’ supreme court over whether a university can be held responsible when students take their own lives. The case is important to colleges and universities because a decision against the university could place an unreasonable burden on untrained employees to stop suicides.

The case involves a student who was allegedly suffering from depression and struggling with his schoolwork.  Then one day, moments after a professor confronted him about something the student wrote in an e-mail, the 25-year-old took his own life.

The student’s family sued, claiming his death was preventable and that the school had a legal duty to use reasonable care to protect him from harm.  MIT has replied that the school wasn’t aware of the severity of the student’s condition and that he was treated by outside professionals, none of whom thought the student was a risk to himself.

The case involves two issues typically covered in a first year Torts class: whether a school has a duty to help students, and whether the decision to commit suicide operates as a superseding cause that defeats the plaintiff’s argument of proximate cause.

There are many cases out there that hold that a university does not have a duty to help adult students protect themselves from harm, or to monitor their daily lives; but this can change if the school has acted in a way that shows it has assumed a duty.  It also may be affected by the state’s law regarding the definition of a “special relationship” which may give rise to a duty to help.

On this issue, there is also the question of whether it would be a good idea to apply a standard designed for health professionals based on the famous Tarasoff case to faculty members (who are typically not trained as medical professionals, much less as psychologists or psychiatrists).

This is an interesting question, but the answer should be that it is not a good idea.  First, let’s not forget that, contrary to popular belief, Tarasoff has not been adopted in all jurisdictions.  (The jurisdiction I live in has rejected it several times.  Go here for one such case.)  So, it can be argued that even applied to health professionals, it is not a good policy to follow.  Second, applying a policy that is based on the specific training of those to whom it applies does not make much sense when you try to extend it to apply to people who do not have that training.  Also, imposing a duty on people who are not trained could have unintended negative consequences.  Fear of liability may cause professors and others without mental health expertise to overreact, which in turn could discourage students from coming forward with their problems to those who could offer help.

As to the second issue, many jurisdictions hold that the decision to commit suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law, perhaps based on the notion that it is unforeseeable that someone would choose to end their life on purpose.  Yet, an argument can be made that this is not always the case.  In fact, it is not difficult to come up with examples of cases where you can argue it is foreseeable that someone would commit (or try to commit) suicide.  For this reason, the cases on this question can be inconsistent.  (For an example of one such case, go here.)

Reportedly, a group of 18 colleges and universities — including Harvard University and Boston College — urged the state supreme court to reject the plaintiffs’ claim, saying a decision in favor of the family could have devastating consequences. Stay tuned.