On the difficult to understand distinction between negligence and recklessness

I have often argued that the distinction between negligence and recklessness is difficult to understand.  True, on paper we can express a definition that supports and distinction between the two concepts.  For example, in New Jersey, “recklessness, unlike negligence, requires a conscious choice of a course of action, with knowledge or a reason to know that it will create serious danger to others.”   Yet, as is often the case, in practice this type of definition (and attempt to distinguish from negligence) is difficult to apply, as a recent case from New Jersey illustrates.

As reported in Golf Dispute Resolution, in this case the plaintiff asked the defendant to show him how to properly hit a golf ball. The plaintiff then said ‘All right, get back.’ He then set up a golf ball on a tee and explained how to set up properly to the ball, how to hold the club and how to start the swing. The plaintiff testified that he thought the defendant had moved back enough that he would not be in harms way, but did not confirm this visually before swinging the club.  Unfortunately, the plaintiff was not out of harms way, and when the defendant swung the club, he struck the plaintiff in the face causing severe injuries.

On these facts, the trial court determined that the defendant’s actions, at most, constituted negligence, requiring that the case against him be dismissed, which in my opinion, was the correct decision.  Often, states require a showing of recklessness in cases involving sports injuries and the conduct in this case does not sound to me to fit the definition of recklessness cited above.

The appellate court disagreed holding that the judge erroneously usurped the role of the factfinder by making findings of fact and liability in matters in dispute between the parties.

I disagree, on these facts, a judge could easily have concluded (in response to a motion to dismiss) that reasonable people would not disagree that the evidence presented did not support a finding of recklessness.

Instead, the court of appeals held that there exists a material fact in dispute concerning whether the defendant "made appropriate observations prior to swinging the golf club consonant with the attendant risk of significant injury to a bystander."

And there is the problem:  saying that we have to decide whether someone "made appropriate observations prior to swinging the golf club consonant with the attendant risk of significant injury to a bystander" is a long way of saying whether the actor acted unlike a reasonable person would have under the circumstances, which is, of course, the standard of negligence.

In other words, the court decided that holding the case was a negligence claim was wrong, but then remanded so the jury could decide the case based on applying a negligence standard.

The case is called Spataro v The Stakemaster and you can read it here.

Colorado Supreme Court has held that attorneys do not owe any duties to non-clients

The Colorado Supreme Court held attorneys owe no duties to non-clients, such as the beneficiaries of a will, absent allegations of fraud, a malicious or tortious act, like negligent misrepresentation.

You can read more about the decision here and here.

The ruling goes against the view expressed in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (Sec 51), followed in several states, which recognizes duties to third parties (non-clients) in several circumstances.

Utah Supreme Court Holds Children Under the Age of Five Cannot Be Liable for Negligence

The Utah Supreme Court recently adopted a bright-line cutoff for liability for negligent children, setting the limit at 5 years old.  The case involved a 4 year old who threw a rubber dolphin at his babysitter.  Unfortunately, the dolphin hit the babysitter in the eye.  She had just had a cornea transplant and the accident blinded her.  The Volokh Conspiracy has the story.

Setting an age limit is not that unusual, but the age itself varies among states.  I have read somewhere that the more common age is 7, but I have not done the research to confirm it.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests the age of 5, which is one of the reasons the Utah Supreme Court chose it.

One interesting thing about age cut offs is that the most famous case regarding intent (as an element for intentional torts) involved a 5 year old.  Remember  Garratt v. Dailey?  I am sure you read it in law school.  It's the case case about the 5 year old who pulls a chair out from under a woman who was about to sit down on it. 

Thanks to TortsProf for the information.

Washington Supreme Court to decide whether doctors have a duty to warn “all foreseeable victims” of potentially dangerous patients in their care

Last month the Supreme Court of the State of Washington heard oral arguments in a case called Volk v. DeMeerleer which raises the issue of whether doctors have a duty to warn “all foreseeable victims” of potentially dangerous patients in their care. In the case, a psychiatrist was sued after one of his patients shot and killed an ex-girlfriend and her son before killing himself. The trial court dismissed the complaint (on summary judgment) on the grounds that the doctor did not have a duty because the patient haad made no specific threats the victims during his treatment. The appeals court reversed (with one judge dissenting), however, holding that the plaintiff could support a cause of action because the patient's conduct was foreseeable and holding that "a question of fact exists as to whether Dr. Howard Ashby and his employer, Spokane Psychiatric Clinic, P.S., owed a duty to protect the general public, including plaintiffs, from violent behavior of patient Jan DeMeerleer." You can read the full appeals court's opinion here.

Leaving aside the fact that this is an odd ruling because the question of whether there is a duty is usually thought of as a question for the court, not the jury, the issue before the court is very interesting.  It calls for the court to expand on the doctrine created by Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, which I am sure you are familiar with.  In that case, the California Supreme Court held that a therapist does have a duty to protect an identifiable victim.  The plaintiffs in Volk are asking the court to extend this notion further because the victims were not identifiable.  The plaintiffs are asking for a duty to "protect the general public."

Tarasoff is a well known case, and a popular one, but it has been rejected by a number jurisdictions.  Also, back in 1979 the Washington Court of Appeals decided a case in which it refused to expand the reach of the Tarasoff doctrine in a case where the victim already knew of the possible threat to her safety. (Interestingly, that case involved a lawyer, rather than a therapist) who arguably had confidential information about a client's intent to harm someone else.)  For these reasons, it would not be entirely surprising if the Washington Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals.  Yet, it will be very interesting to see what happens.

A finding for the plaintiff will have serious implications for the medical profession, and potentially for the legal profession too, because such a ruling will affect the principle of confidentiality.  It is because of the importance of confidentiality that courts have either rejected Tarasoff or refused to expand its reach.  Take a look at Thapar v Zezulka, 994 SW2d 635 (Tex 1999) (medical profession) and Hawkins v. King Cty. Dept. of Rehabilitative Services, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (legal profession).

The New York Times published an Op-Ed piece on this case written by a doctor in which he argues the court should reject the plaintiffs' claim and protect the value of confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship.  You can read it here.  The argument is a good one, although the author makes a horrible mistake in his analysis when he illustrates his duty of confidentiality by telling a story of a time when he destroyed illegal drugs handed to him by a patient in order to help the patient avoid arrest.  In doing so, the doctor was not protecting the patient's confidentiality but, at helping someone destroy evidence of a crime; but I suppose that is another story.  (The article generated two letters to the editor, one of which points out this issue.)

On the question of a possible duty in tort, I do agree the court should rule for the defendant.  Even if the duty recognized in Tarasoff applies in the jurisdiction, a duty to warn the general public when there is no indication of specific plans or specific possible victims is too broad. 

Illinois court of appeals reaffirms its policy to reject Tarasoff, ... or does it?

Just a few days ago the Illinois Court of Appeals issued an opinion in a case called Sherer v. Sarma in which it once again followed the state's policy that rejects the imposition of a duty to warn on a psychotherapist made famous by the Surpeme Court of California in Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California.  You can read the opinion here.

As you probably remember from your days in law school, in Tarasoff the court was asked to decide whether a therapist has a duty to warn an unsuspecting possible victim of the expressed intent of a patient to cause her harm.  The court found that even though the therapist did not have a relationship with the victim, he did owe her a duty to warn.  The court opined that the benefit of having the therapist help prevent an injury to someone who did not know was in danger is more important that the duty of confidentiality owed to the patient and than the possible negative effects on the process of therapy itself.

Meanwhile, in Illinois, the courts have considered the same questions and have decided to take the opposite approach, finding that not recognizing a duty to warn advances the goals of protecting the confidentiality of the medical treatment, which itself promotes better opportunities for treatment.

One can disagree whether it is better to adopt or to reject Tarasoff, but the fact of the matter is that courts in Illinois have rejected it, ... for the most part.

Now, I have to say "for the most part" because in an unnecessary attempt to qualify the ruling the opinions would recognize a duty to warn if:  (1) the patient made specific threats of violence, (2) the threats of violence were directed against a specific and readily identifiable victim, and (3) there is a direct physician-patient relationship between the defendant and the victim or a special relationship between the patient and the victim.

But wait!  If there is a duty to warn under these circumstances, including circumstances in which there is no relationship between the doctor and the victim as long as there is a relationship between the patient and the victim, how can we say that the state does not follow Tarasoff?   The three elements that would support a finding of a duty to warn are pretty much what supports the duty to warn in Tarasoff, are they not?

But wait; there's more!!  In Sherer v Sarma, the actor and the victim were both patients of the defendant and they were husband and wife.  Yet the court did not find those relationships to be special relationships for purposes of the doctrine.  If the circumstances in this case did not meet the three elements listed above, under what circumstances would Illinois recognize a duty to warn?  

Informed consent to a CT scan?

 Courts usually define the duty to provide information in medical informed consent cases as limited to "material risks."  But what makes a risk "material"?  Sometimes this is determined by the practice in the profession and sometimes by asking what a reasonable patient would have liked to have known.  Regardless of the standard, what is "material" also has something to do with the level of risk. 

So, should patients be told the level of risk of a CT scan? 

CT scans have been getting a lot of attention lately because new studies have shown they expose people to a lot more radiation that previously thought. (CT scans are a high powered x-ray used to provide clearer images than a traditional x-ray. The scan exposes patients to the radiation equivalent of 100 to 500 chest x-rays.)  And now a new study reveals that patients are often not informed about the levels of radiation exposure and other health risks they may face.  The study, published recently in JAMA Internal Medicine examined data from a questionnaire given to nearly 300 patients undergoing CT scans at the Denver Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) during November and December 2011.

Go here for more on this story.

Is a doctor negligent for advocating that people should be hungry all the time?

I will start covering medical malpractice in my torts class in a couple of days so I thought it would be relevant to post this story today.  It is a story about a physician - a cardiologist - who advocates patients to live on a diet based on how much their food weighs.  The story was reported back in June, but I just read about it for the first time today in a fellow law professor's blog.

The doctor's theories on managing weight became news when he was connected to the investigation of the death of a child.  According to news accounts, the child's mom, who was charged with murder for allegedly starving her teen daughter to death, was following the advice of the doctor who encourages people to eat just 32 ounces of food a day. The child, who was 15 or 16, weighed about 40 pounds.

In a video available in YouTube (and here and here), the doctor explains the "scientific" principles behind his theories saying that "being hungry is wonderful. The opposite of hungry, which is not hungry, is the opposite of wonderful, which is terrible."  He also claims to mathematically "prove" that being hungry is wonderful by explaining that "when we're 10 times hungrier, doesn't food tastes 10 times better? And when food tastes 10 times better, that's wonderful, isn't it?... It's a mathematical principle."

Well, there you have it! Who can argue against such scientific evidence, right?!

According to some accounts, the doctor has been called everything from "crazy" to a "caring" and "very educated" man whose findings are rooted in science and scripture.  Crazy? Nooo; really?  Who would think that?...  although I do find the suggestion of scientific findings rooted in science and scripture rather puzzling, to say the least.

OK; so here is the torts angle I would want my students to consider.  Let's assume the doctor actually suggests to a patient to go on a diet based on how much the food weighs, which, by the way, is what this doctor suggests.  His idea is not based on calories, but on actual weight.  Put your plate on a scale, fill it up until it weighs 2 pounds and that is all you get to eat all day.  Sure it is an easy diet to follow - if you have an accurate scale at home, I guess - but is it healthy?  Does this "medical advice" follow the standard of care of the profession?    And if it doesn't and a patient following the advice suffers an injury, could they bring a cause of action?

To complicate matters, what if the person is not an actual patient of the doctor but someone who read his book or his website and followed the advice published there (in print or online).  Can that person bring a claim?

Your thoughts?

For more details on this bizarre story go to ABC news.com, The Daily Mail and The New York Daily News.

Standard of care that applies to children?

This re-post does not really have anything to do with torts but because in two days we will cover the standard of care that applies to children, I am going to post it here.  It comes from the very funny blog "Say What?" which collects true funny stories from real life cases.  In this particular case, a teenager apparently got some citations (for speeding, I guess) but did not tell his parents (both attorneys).  As a result a warrant was issued.  The parents then filed a motion to withdraw the warrant in which they stated:

2. Defendant is a teenage boy and therefore, as a matter of law, doesn’t have a lick of good sense. Despite the fact that his parents are licensed attorneys, Defendant felt it was the better course to not tell them about the citations. Therefore, upon information and belief, the dog ate the citations.

When submitting the story to "Say What?", the judge added  “After wiping the tears from my eyes, I signed the order as Municipal Court Judge/Mother of a Teenage Son.” 

Podcast on litigation over damages caused by bedbugs

The Legal Talk Network has a new podcast discussing  issues related to litigation over damages caused by bedbugs.  The description of the show reads: "All across America, from motels to five‑star hotels, bed bugs are affecting people both physically and mentally, resulting in lawsuits. These tiny creatures are not only limited to hotels, but can be found virtually anywhere; from apartments, schools, and hospitals, to warehouses, box springs, and mattresses. Ringler Radio host, Larry Cohen joins Ringler colleague and co-host, Ross Duncan and guest, Attorney Daniel W, Whitney, managing partner of Whitney & Bogris, LLP, as they take a look at the impact of bedbugs, the preventive measures to help avoid them, as well as some of the litigation that’s risen up to combat the problem."  You can listen to the program here.

Maryland court clarifies that locality rule does not apply anymore

According to the so-called "locality rule," the conduct of a doctor should be evaluated by comparing it to the standard of care specific to the community in which the medical care was given. Although this doctrine has been abandoned, courts often still use confusing language that might suggest it still applies in some jurisdictions.  Apparently, this is the case in Maryland where a statute still mentions that a medical malpractice expert must give testimony that the care given by the defendant doctor "is not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities."

A few weeks ago, however, the notion that the locality rule still applies in Maryland was dispelled by a Maryland District Court judge in a case called Willison v Pandey (available here).

Thanks to the Maryland Medical Malpractice Attorney Blog and the Maryland Injury Lawyer Blog for the links.

Med mal cases based on patient's suicide

Popular blogger Eric Turkewitz has posted a short comment on a recent medical malpractice case that originated in a patient's suicide.  The case illustrates the importance of determining whether a physician acted below the standard of car or whether he or she simply made an error of judgment in treating the patient.  Go here for more.

New York's erroneous approach to assumption of the risk in golf cases

Golf fans probably enjoyed watching the duel between Phil Mickelson and Bubba Watson this weekend. (Watson won by one stroke, in case you care.) Mickelson played very well and could have won, but he missed a couple of close putts and at one point hit a ball off the tee that went off target and hit a spectator. What does this have to do with torts? It reminded me that I had not yet reported on the decision of a case I have been following for over a year!

Long time readers of this blog will remember that back in April of 2009 I reported on a case called Anand v. Kapoor in which the court discussed the issue of whether a golfer can be liable for his conduct on the golf course if this conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In the end, the court held that the voluntary decision to participate in the game means that golfers assume the risk of injury. As I said last year in my original post on this case, I disagree with this holding as a torts professor and as a golfer!

The court's decision is available here. My original comments about it is availble here and here. The case was appealed and last December the Appeals Court issued its ruling. In a 2 page long opinion that adds nothing to the one by the lower court, the court affirmed. I still don't like the result, but because the new opinion adds nothing, I will not repeat my objections to the analysis here. You can read my older posts on the subject mentioned above. For more go to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog and to Jonathan Turley's blog.

New York's erroneous approach to assumption of the risk is back in the news

Long time readers of this blog will remember that I have criticized New York courts on more than one occasion for their sloppy analysis when it comes to the concept of assumption of the risk. See here and here, for example.  The first of these cases, about which I reported on back in April of 2009 is back in the news because the Court of Appeals just heard oral arguments. I am hoping the Court corrects the mistake.

The case is called Anand v. Kapoor and it is available here. My original comment about it is availble here. This is the case in which the New York state Appellate Division, Second Department, discussed the issue of whether a golfer can be liable for his conduct on the golf course if this conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

In the end, the court held that the voluntary decision to participate in the game means that golfers assume the risk of injury regardless of how the injury occurs. 

As I said last year in my original post on this case, I disagree with this holding as a torts professor and as a golfer!

Sports activities do present risks to participants but that does not mean that other participants do not have a duty to act like reasonable people. Even if there is an inherent risk of getting hit by a ball on the golf course -- something I am not sure I agree with -- I don't think that means a golfer assumes the risk of getting injuried because of another golfer's negligence ... unless what the court is trying to say is that golfers simply have no duty to exercise due care when playing the game, which, in my opinion, would be contrary to public policy.

 For my full comment on the case go here. For more on the case go to the Wall Street Journal law blog.

UPDATE (January 31, 2011):  The Appeals Court has affirmed the lower court.  Go here for my comments.

Learned intermediary doctrine protects pharmacy from having to alert customer of dangerous drug interaction

While some jurisdictions are adopting the learned intermediary doctrine (here) and others are abandoning it (here), the Illinois Court of Appeals has just issued a short but interesting case on the issue of whether the learned intermediary doctrine relieves a pharmacy from a duty to warn a customer of a potential drug interaction.

As you probably know, the learned intermediary doctrine provides that manufacturers of prescription drugs do not have duty to warn consumers directly of the risks involved in using prescription drugs because they can rely on the physicians who prescribe them to do so. In Illinois, the doctrine has for a long time, and with only one exception, been applied to exempt pharmacies and pharmacists from liability for failing to give warnings to patients. Part of the reasoning for extending the use of the doctrine in this manner is to prevent the pharmacist from second guessing the physician -- who the doctrine assumes is the best qualified and best positioned person to determine what is best for the patient -- and thus to prevent having the pharmacist interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.

The new case decided by the Illinois Court of Appeals is called DiGiovanni v. Albertson's Inc and it is availble here. In it, the court follows the long standing rule in the state that recognizes the protection provided by the learned intermediary doctrine for pharmacists. Given the long standing approach on the issue in the state and given the specific facts of the case, the case is correctly decided, but I have some mixed feelings about it.

As I have commented before (here), it may be time to revisit the whole LID doctrine to begin with. And, I believe it is unnecessary to apply it to pharmacists. I do not see a problem in holding pharmacists to the same standard of care that we hold everyone else. They should act like reasonable people under the circumstances. If they do, there will be no liability. The result in this case would have been the same had we applied that simple rule.

 The facts were clear that the pharmacist acted reasonably. The record indicates that the pharmacist called the physician prior to filling the prescription regarding the potential interaction, and the physician indicated that he would monitor the patient. Under those circumstances, the pharmacist was reasonable in relying on the expertise of the doctor. Perhaps the pharmacist could have told the patient to check with his doctor about the possible drug interaction too, but I am not sure that we can say that - under the circumstances - failing to do so should result in liability.

I guess my point is that the main concern here should be to develop a doctrine that seeks to provide the consumer with more protection. If it requires that pharmacists use their expertise by double checking with the doctor or telling the patient do double check with the doctor before exposing the patient to a known risk, so be it. The burden on the pharmacist to make a phone call or give a word of warning to a customer seems well worth it to me.

Should parents be punished for smoking while their kids are in the car?

I find the issue of whether parents should be liable for injuries to their children very interesting. In class, I have discussed the issue in several different contexts. For example, there is the question of whether a mother should be liable to a child born with injuries that can be traced to her conduct while she was pregnant, and the issue of whether a child should have a cause of action for injuries caused when a parent refuses to allow medical treatment to a child for religious reasons. These are controversial/complicated topics. In other contexts, the issue typically depends on whether the court wants to allow parents leeway in making parental decisions on how to discipline their children or on how to educate them etc. I am writing about this today because according to a recent story in The Consumerist the New York State Assembly is considering a bill to prohibit smoking in a car when riding with a child under the age of 14. The bill would impose a $100 fine for every violation. The story is available here but the more interesting part is the readers' comments under it. Here is one initial question: should parents be liable for injuries caused to their children from second hand smoke? I am sure you can argue that, given what we now know about second hand smoke, a reasonable prudent person would not smoke in a closed space when children are present, couldn't you? Also, assuming the proposed law is adopted, should the statute be used as the basis for a "negligence per se" argument against the parents? It can clearly be argued that the statute is appropriate to be considered an expression of a duty of care and therefore that its violation would be evidence of negligence. Assuming there is no parental immunity in the jurisdiction, this would allow a child to sue his or her own parent for damages caused by the violation. On the other hand, it can be argued it is unlikely that a court would take this view because imposing tort liability would result in a very disproportionate level of liability when compared to the level of libility originally intended by the legislature under the statute. This, I think, would be a strong argument given a violation of the statute only results in a $100 fine. Also, as a practical matter, it is not likely that a single violation would give rise to an injury for which the child could recover damages. Thus the question might be more theoretical. The recognition of the theoretical possibility perhaps could, in turn, open the door to more claims based on parents' conduct. Thanks to the Consumer Law and Policy Blog for the information.

Radiation Exposure Concerns Lead To New Industry Standards

AboutLawsuits.com is reporting that radiation therapy equipment manufacturers have launched an initiative to implement new industry-wide safety standards in the face of FDA scrutiny and growing concern over the radiation risks of CT scans and radiation-emitting medical devices. Go here for the full story.

New York court adds to the confusion re assumption of the risk

Long time readers of this blog will remember that I have criticized New York courts on more than one occasion for their sloppy analysis when it comes to the concept of assumption of the risk. See here and here. Now comes news of yet another case from New York that adds to the confusion. In a case called Ballou v. Ravena-Coeymans-Selkirk School District (available here), the court held that although a cheerleader assumes some risk when practicing stunts with her squad, her participation in the potentially dangerous activity is not a complete defense by her school district for liability for the serious injuries she suffered and that "[s]chools are required to exercise reasonable care to protect student athletes from unassumed, concealed or unreasonable increased risks." The decision on this case may be irrelevant now that, just a few days ago, NY's highest court held that assumption of the risk was not a valid defense if the plaintiff is a minor. See here. But to the extent that it adds to the debate on the issue of assumption of the risk, it follows the wrong type of analysis I have criticized in the past. What I have argued in the past is that courts in NY use the "primary assumption of the risk" analysis to support the conclusion that a plaintiff is unable to satisfy the prima facie element of duty. This has nothing to do with assumption of the risk, which is a an affirmative defense based on an evaluation of the plaintiff's conduct. Using the phrase "primary assumption of the risk" to refer to cases in which the issue is whether there is a duty is confusing (at least). The Ballou case reported today follows this line of reasoning when it holds, as quoted above, that "[s]chools are required to exercise reasonable care to protect student athletes from unassumed, concealed or unreasonable increased risks." Note what this statement actually says. It says that under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff can support a claim that the defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care. In other words, once again, the court is using the language of assumption of the risk (supposedly an affirmative defense) to reach a conclusion related to an element of the prima facie case. The issue in the case was whether the defendant had a duty, not whether the plaintiff assumed the risk. Until NY courts gets this distinction straight, they will continue to make the same mistake. For more on the story, go to Law.com.

Georgia Supreme Court upholds higher burden of proof in ER med mal cases

Yesterday, in a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the constitutionality of a rule that requires a higher burden of proof in cases of negligence on the part of emergency room personnel. The rule requires the plaintiff to show "gross negligence" on the part of emergency room doctors in order to sustain a medical malpractice claim. The case is called Gliemmo v. Cousineau. The majority concluded that to be constitutional, the law needs only to bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose and that "promoting affordable liability insurance for health care providers and hospitals, and thereby promoting the availability of quality health care services, are certainly legitimate legislative purposes." I have not read the actual opinion so I can't comment on how the case was presented or on how this conclusion was reached, but the conclusion is disturbing because I have never seen any evidence that proves convincingly that making it more difficult for plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action results in lower insurance rates for doctors or in affordable health care for consumers. I have posted numerous articles that refute the court's implied conclusion. You can find these posts - with numerous links to other articles - by going here and scrolling down. Go here for the full story.

Jury awards $16.6 million in "Hold your wee for a wii" wrongful death case

Readers of this blog may remember that I have been following the story behind the "hold your wee for a wii" radio contest which ended in a contestant's death from water intoxication. If you don't remember what this case was about, go here and here first. Now comes the news that the trial is over and the jury has awarded $16.6 million to the family of the victim. Go here for the full story. Thanks to the TortsProf Blog for the link.

"Hold Your Wee for a Wii" Trial Ends

The TortsProf blog is reporting today that the trial in the infamous "hold your wee for a wii" radio contest has ended. If you don't remember what this case was about, go here and here first. For more current information, TortsProf is providing the following helpful links: for an overview of the trial go here. For complete trial coverage go to this blog. Thanks to William Childs for the info and the links.