Torts deterrence effect: After multiple lawsuits alleging brain injuries, Six Flags retires popular roller coaster

The X2 roller coaster at Six Flags Magic Mountain, once described on the amusement park’s website as a “rite of passage for the ultimate daredevil,” has been shut down amid lawsuits alleging that the ride caused serious brain injuries.  The ABA Journal has the story here.

Yet another lawsuit filed against ChatGPT for its alleged role in a user's suicide

 Since August of last year I have seen several cases filed in different jurisdictions against AI platforms alleging in one way or another that the platform contributed to a person's decision to commit suicide.  See here, and here.  I also reported on the fact that Nevada decided to abandon the so-called "suicide rule" which will make it less difficult to support a prima face case for injuries caused by suicide.  See here.

So, today I am reporting on yet another case filed against ChatGPT.  In this one, the mother of a man who killed himself after conversing with the chatbot is suing the generative artificial intelligence company OpenAI and its CEO and founder, Sam Altman. According to the article, the mother alleges that the AI platform coached her son into suicide, even while he told ChatGPT that he did not want to die.

You can read more about this case here.

Another lawsuit filed against makers of ChatGPT based on the AI platform's alleged role in a suicide

 I recently posted a comment on a case filed by the parents of a minor suing the makers of ChatGPT alleging that the AI platform helped their son commit suicide (see here).

Now comes news that a similar lawsuit has been filed in California.  In this one, in its capacity as executor to a deceased woman, a bank filed the claim against the maker of ChatGPT arguing that the platform was responsible for inducing a mentally unstable son to kill his elderly mother and then commit suicide.

Courthouse News Service has the full story here, and NPR has a brif audio commentary here.

California expands the notion of "present at the scene" and "a contemporaneous sensory observance" of an accident for purposes of a claim for emotional distress of a bystander

 You probably remember from law school the development of the law related to claims by bystanders for emotional distress at witnessing someone else suffer an injury.  It originated in California with the famous case of Dillon v. Legg in which a mother saw a car hit one of her daughters.  In that case, the mother was not within the so-called zone of danger and would not have recovered under the applicable doctrine at the time, but the court adopted a new approach to the question.  Under the new approach, a bystander outside the zone of danger could support a claim if she could show that she had a close personal relationship with the victim, that she had a contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident and that she was present at the scene of the accident.  

Since that case was decided, the new approach was slowly adopted by a small majority of jurisdictions and law professors like me have explored the different possible consequences of its application by creating hypos involving all sorts of complicated scenarios.  In one of my hypos, for example, I ask the students, what if the mother is watching a live TV broadcast of the Olympics when her daughter suffers an injury.

Some jurisdictions have also explored different variations of the scenario.  For example, some have decided cases explaining how this type of claim should be decided if the plaintiff is away from the scene of the accident and only hears about it from someone else who witnesses it, or if the plaintiff does not see the accident, but sees its aftermath, or if the plaintiff does not see the accident but hears it, and so on.

I am writing about this today because I just saw an article in the ABA Journal reporting that a new case in California has finally decided one of the typical law school hypos:  what if the plaintiff is not at the scene but has a contemporaneous sensory observance of it by "technology."  

In this new case, the court held that a mother who heard her daughter’s car crash while giving her directions by cellphone has a right to recover.  The case is called Downey v City of Riverside, and you can read it here.

In my opinion, the decision is not surprising.  Granted the plaintiff was not "present at the scene" as originally required by Dillon v Legg, but I always thought that the element of having a contemporaneous sensory observance would become more important if the technology involved could at least provide some support for a feeling of "presence" at the scene.  In the end, however, it seems that the trajectory of the doctrine is heading toward minimizing the need for presence at the scene as long as the element of a contemporaneous sensory observance is strong.

As always, it is interesting to see how the common law expands and contracts as time goes on and it will be interesting to see where the courts go from here.

Federal Court denies motion to dismiss claim against Amazon for damages caused by product sold by a "third party seller" through Amazon's website

Two years ago I reported that a California Appellate Court held that Amazon can be liable in products liability for products sold by other vendors through Amazon.  See here.  A few months later, the Texas Supreme Court reached the exact opposite result.  See here.

I am writing about this today again because a a federal court in Louisiana recently declined to issue judgment in favor of Amazon on its argument that it is not liable for products sold by about two million “third party sellers,” such as the one that sold a defective battery charger that caused a deadly house fire resulting in this wrongful death lawsuit.  You can read the decision here.

California Governor Signs Bill Raising Medical Negligence Caps

A few weeks ago, Governor Gavin Newsom signed Assembly Bill No. 35 into law, which received unanimous support for raising the California medical malpractice pain and suffering cap to reflect inflation, and provides better support for those who have been tragically hurt or killed by a medical mistake.

AboutLawsuits.com has the story here; the TortProf blog has a comment here.

New study in California concludes what we knew already: placing caps on damages in malpractice cases does not reduce malpractice

 As California seeks to pass new legislation that would increase the amount victims can recover for pain and suffering in medical malpractice lawsuits, a new study shows that setting damage caps for pain and suffering reduces the incentive to avoid malpractice, and results in an increased rate of malpractice lawsuits.  And, an increased rate of malpractice claims ultimately raises the potential cost to patients and insurers, along with noneconomic losses suffered by victims.

In other words, caps in malpractice lawsuits do not have any of the effects proponents of caps always argue they will have.  They do not result in deterrence, may result in higher costs, and do not prevent higher insurance premiums.

You can read more about the study here.

Oklahoma Supreme Court reverses judgment against opioid manufacturers in public nuisance case; but lower court in Ohio finds against pharmacies

About three weeks ago, (on November 7) I posted a story about a decision in California dismissing a claim for public nuisance against several opioid manufacturers and distributors.  Two days after that, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma announced a decision reversing a trial court's judgment against opioid manufacturers in a similar case.  The case is State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson and Johnson and you can find it here.

These two decisions resulted in an article in the NY Times with the very descriptive title "The Core Legal Strategy Against Opioid Companies May Be Faltering."  You can read it here.

Yet, a couple of weeks later a jury in Ohio found that three retail pharmacy chains created a public nuisance by recklessly distributing vast amounts of pain pills in two Ohio counties.  See here.  I have no doubt this verdict will be appealed. 

Evidently, the litigation over the opioid crisis is a big deal.  There are thousands of pending cases and how each is decided ultimately will influence how the issue is addressed in other jurisdictions.  

If we go by history, the use of public nuisance as a way to address social problems created by distribution of products has not been successful.  The vast majority of cases that attempted it failed, including cases against tobacco companies, lead paint manufacturers and gun manufacturers and distributors.  For this reason, the cases against opioid manufacturers are going to be difficult to win.  But it is possible courts will change their view on this.  I am very interested in following this story which will not go away any time soon.

Here is a short PBS News report that summarizes many of the issues involved in the current litigation.  (While you are at it, if you are interested, you can find many other videos on the topic of the opioid crisis on YouTube.)

More coverage on the verdict against the pharmacy chains here:  AboutLawsuits.com, ABA Journal, NPR, The Guardian, and Courthouse News.

Judge recently issued a "tentative decision" against the plaintiffs in California case related to opioid crisis

If you have been watching "Dopesick" on Hulu or "Goliath" on Amazon Primes, you might be disappointed to hear that this week a judge in California issued a "tentative decision" holding that a lawsuit seeking to hold drug companies liable for the opioid crisis must fail because the plaintiffs didn’t show that false and misleading marketing caused an increase in medically inappropriate prescriptions.  The defendants included Johnson & Johnson, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Endo International and AbbVie Inc.’s Allergan unit.

More than 3,300 lawsuits have been filed by state and local governments over the opioid crisis. In the only other case that went to trial, an Oklahoma judge found Johnson & Johnson liable for $465 million. 

The ABA Journal has the full story here.  Reuters has more here, and NPR's coverage is here.

Texas Supreme Court holds that Amazon can not be held liable for injuries caused by products sold by others through Amazon

Back in May I reported that a California Appellate Court held that Amazon can be liable in products liability for products sold by other vendors through Amazon.  As this happened, the exact same issue was certified to the Texas Supreme Court, and now we have a ruling.

In direct contrast with the California Appellate Court, the Texas Supreme Court held that Amazon can NOT be liable because it does not act as a seller.  

If you are looking for good topic for a law review article, here you go!  Now you have two totally opposite views on exactly the same issue.  

In both cases Amazon argued that it should not be liable to the consumer because it operates only as a marketplace, not as a seller in the chain of commerce.  The court in California did not agree, but the court in Texas did.  

The California court found that Amazon operated as a seller, or at least a distributor in the chain of commerce, rather than as a neutral "mall".  Amazon handled all product advertising, payment processing, and communication between the buyer and the manufacturer.   Also, Amazon may be the only member of the distribution chain reasonably available for an injured consumer to recover damages.

The Texas court held that Amazon did not qualify as a seller because it was not engaged in the business of distributing products through ordinary sales or placing products in the stream of commerce through non-sale commercial transactions, even though Amazon controlled the process of the transaction and the delivery of the product.

It is difficult for me to understand how someone who "controls the process of the transaction and delivery of the product" is not placing the product in the stream of commerce, so my best guess is that the issue comes down to the phrase "ordinary sales."  

Courthouse Network News has a short analysis of the case here.

Trial related to destroyed frozen embryos raises interesting questions -- UPDATED again

This story is updated below, at the end of the original post

I just read a story on Courthouse News on a trial in which the plaintiffs are suing the manufacturer of cryogenic tanks that somehow failed causing the destruction of thousands of frozen eggs and embryos, which according to the plaintiffs dashed some families’ only hope of having biological children.

The plaintiffs' claim is for product liability based on the alleged defective design of the tanks.  The defendant, however, is apparently going to argue that the tank's failure was due to the misuse of the product by the Fertility Center which used it.  This is the first interesting point in the case because that argument is essentially claiming that the conduct of the Fertility Clinic was an unforeseeable intervening (and therefore superseding) cause.  

Yet, the most interesting question raised by this case relates to the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs.  The story states that the claims "for the loss of eggs and embryos" were sent to private arbitration.

So, my first question is what is a claim for the "loss of" the eggs and embryos?   I am assuming "embryos" refers to fertilized eggs, while eggs are not fertilized.  If that is the case, there can be no claim for wrongful death for the loss of the eggs in any jurisdiction I know of.  And for the loss of the embryos, there can be a wrongful death claim only in jurisdictions that recognize that life begins at conception for purposes of the wrongful death act.  So I wonder if the claim is not for wrongful death but for something else?  Is it just a contracts dispute then?  I just don' know.

On the other hand, maybe the claim is for emotional distress, but that claim would depend on the jurisdiction's approach to those claims?  If the jurisdiction requires impact, I don't think there is support for the claim, for example.  Also, the facts don't seem to fit a claim for emotional distress of a bystander.  

Since the case is already at trial, I guess these questions were resolved already through motions to dismiss, etc.  But I wonder what the answers are.  

UPDATE May 30, 2021:  Courthouse News is following the trial closely.  This week they published the following stories:

On May 26:  Lab Workers Were ‘Devastated’ by Tank Failure That Destroyed Human Embryos

On May 27:  Tank Manufacturer Accuses Fertility Clinic of Falsifying Data in Frozen Eggs Trial 

June 6: Fertility Patients Describe Sadness and Anger After Freezer Tank Failure

June 9: Jurors Asked to Award $30 Million for Lost Eggs and Embryos

June 10: Jury Finds Tank Maker Responsible for Lost Eggs and Embryos, Awards $15 Million

June 12: Loss of Embryos and Eggs at Fertility Clinic Leads to Groundbreaking Multi-Million Dollar Verdict in California

June 20: $15 Million Verdict Against IVF Cryopreservation Tank Maker Is Big News

California Appellate Court finds that Amazon can be liable in products liability for products sold by other vendors through Amazon

Last year I reported on a recently decided case in California finding that Amazon.com could be liable for products liability.  See here.  Earlier this year, I reported that the Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on a similar case.  See here.

Today, I am reporting that an appellate court in California recently decided that Amazon can be held liable for injuries caused by product bought from independent third party sellers through Amazon.  The case is called Loomis v. Amazon.com, and you can read the opinion here.

In Loomis, the plaintiff bought a product from a manufacturer who paid Amazon a "subscription" to sell products in Amazon and a small fee (15% of the sale price).  Amazon argued that it should not be liable to the consumer because it operates only as a marketplace, not as a seller in the chain of commerce.  The court didn't buy it (excuse the pun!).

The court found that Amazon operated as a seller, or at least a distributor in the chain of commerce, rather than as a neutral "mall".  Amazon handled all product advertising, payment processing, and communication between Loomis and the manufacturer, which was not allowed to speak with her directly.  Also, Amazon may be the only member of the distribution chain reasonably available for an injured consumer to recover damages.

Texas to decide whether Amazon can be held liable in products liability claim caused by product sold by a third party on its website

Back in August of last year, I reported that an appellate court in California found that Amazon.com could be sued for products liability for the value of injuries caused by defective goods sold on its website by third-party vendors.  See here.

Today I am writing to let you know that the same issue is now before the Texas Supreme Court.  Courthouse News Service is reporting that the issue is before the court in a case centered around a remote control battery swallowed by a 19-month-old child.  Go here for more information.

California appellate court finds that Amazon can be sued for products liability

In an important new decision, a California state appellate court recently held that Amazon is subject to product liability claims for defective goods sold on its website by third-party vendors. The case is called Bolger v. Amazon and you can read the opinion here.

The key to why this is important is that last phrase: "third party vendors."  Amazon did not manufacture or retail the product.  It merely provided a space for the retailer to "connect" with its buyers.  For that reason, Amazon argued that it was not part of the chain of distribution, as that concept is typically used in products liability cases.  But the court held that “Whatever term we use to describe Amazon’s role, be it ‘retailer,’ ‘distributor,’ or merely ‘facilitator,’ it was pivotal in bringing the product here to the consumer.”

This case follows the first successful product liability case against Amazon (in Pennsylvania) which was then appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded to Pennsylvania Supreme Court this past June.  That case is now pending.

For more on Bolger v. Amazon, go to Courthouse News Service, LawStreet, and the ABA Journal.

California sues JUUL Labs

California and the city of Los Angeles sued e-cigarette maker Juul Labs on Monday, claiming the company caused a public health crisis by targeting teens with fruity, fun flavored vaping products and did not verify the age of its customers for online sales.  Here is the full story.  Bloomberg law podcast has a 7 minute comment on the claim here.

California has adopted a statute banning use of race, gender, or ethnicity in the calculation of tort damages

California has adopted a statute that prohibits the use of race, gender, and ethnicity in the calculation of lost earnings or impaired earning capacity in tort damages.  The crucial language of S.B. 41 is: "estimations, measures, or calculations of past, present, or future damages for lost earnings or impaired earning capacity resulting from personal injury or wrongful death shall not be reduced based on race, ethnicity, or gender."

Thanks to TortProf blog for the update.

Alaska reiterates its approach to bystander emotional distress claims, which is very different than the one used in most other jurisdictions

As you probably know, back in 1968 the California Supreme Court created what has now become the majority approach to claims by people who suffer emotional distress at witnessing injuries suffered by others.  According to that approach, the claim is limited to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim, are present at the scene of the accident and who have a contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident.  Someone who is told about an accident after it happens or who arrives at the scene only to observe the aftermath, would not have a claim.

Alaska, however, never adopted the requirement of the contemporaneous sensory observance.  According to this approach, the plaintiff can support a claim as long as he or she is a close relative of the victim and that, under the circumstances, it is reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress.  This means the notion of duty in Alaska in these types of cases is broader and defendants are exposed to liability in many more cases.

I am writing about this today because I just read that the Alaska Supreme Court has again reiterated its approach to this issue in a new case called Doan v. Banner Health, Inc., (available in Westlaw at 2019 WL 2312537).

In this case, a mother, who was in a hospital waiting room when her daughter died, brought a NIED claim against medical providers for the distress she suffered upon seeing her daughter’s body. 

This claim would have been rejected in any state that follows the California approach and, obviously, in all states that reject it in favor of the "zone of danger" approach.  To my knowledge, this leaves only Alaska and Puerto Rico.

Thanks to the TortsProf blog for the update.

California Supreme Court says defendants in products liability cases may use evidence of industry custom

Strict products liability was born in California and many states still look to California law for guidance on products liability law issues.  For that reason, it is worth noting that late last August, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Kim v. Toyota Motor Corporation in which it was asked to determine whether, in a strict products liability action, evidence that a product’s design conforms with industry custom and practice is relevant and admissible.  Several appellate decisions in California had previously had held that such evidence is categorically inadmissible, but the lower appellate court in Kim had taken a different approach, saying "it depends.”

In a 5-2 decision, the court acknowledged that evidence that a product was manufactured following the custom does not, by itself, prove that the product is not defective, but the court held that evidence of industry custom and practice may be relevant for other purposes, “including the jury’s evaluation of whether the product is as safely designed as it should be, considering the feasibility and cost of alternative designs.”  In other words, the court held that the evidence can be used together with other evidence as part of the analysis to determine whether the product is defective. 

This result is actually not that surprising and it follows the general approach developed by courts following the Restatement 2d's approach to products liability (as opposed to the one in the Restatement 3d, which is followed by a minority of jurisdictions.)

You can read the opinion here.

You can read more about the case here.

Massachusetts and California rule universities have a limited duty to help students because of special relationship

As readers of this blog know, the general common law did not recognize a duty to help or to control the conduct of others.  However, over time, courts (and eventually the Restatement) recognized limited duties in certain circumstances.  One of the most commonly accepted of these exceptions to the general rule is based on the existence of a special relationship.

Traditionally, a special relationship exists when a person is dependent on the other for safety.  Whether a relationship constitutes a special relationship which creates a duty to help, or protect, has usually been interpreted narrowly and for a long time was limited to the relationship between common carriers and their passengers and innkeepers and their guests.  However, some jurisdictions (and the Restatement) have considered extending the notion of special relationships to include other circumstances including the relationships between landlords and tenants, and commercial establishments and their customers.

As you would expect, whether schools have a special relationship with their students is a common question.  Because of the types of schools and ages of the students, the analysis is different if the case involves elementary schools or high schools, as opposed to colleges and universities.

There are lots of cases out there related to injuries suffered by students in college campuses, but not all jurisdictions have decided whether the schools have a duty to help or protect the students based on the relationship between the school and the student.

You may remember from your law school days a case called Hegel v Langsam used by many textbooks to illustrate the generally accepted rule that universities do not have a general duty to protect students.  Yet, according to some, there seems to be a trend to recognize (or impose) a duty in recent times.

Now we can add Massachusetts and California to the list of states that have decided the issue in favor of imposing a limited duty on the university.

Last December I wrote about a case brought against MIT that asked whether the university should be held responsible in a wrongful death claim based on the fact that a student took his own lives.  You can read my initial comments about the case here.

The student’s family sued, claiming his death was preventable and that the school had a legal duty to use reasonable care to protect him from harm.  MIT replied that the school wasn’t aware of the severity of the student’s condition and that he was treated by outside professionals, none of whom thought the student was a risk to himself.

I just read that the Supreme Court of Massachusetts issued its opinion yesterday.  I have not read the opinion itself, so I can't comment in detail but from what I have read, the court found that a university has a duty to take action if it is aware that a student has attempted, or has threatened, to commit suicide while enrolled at the university.  I do not know of any other cases that have found that universities have a duty to prevent suicides. 

Meanwhile, in California, the Supreme Court decided back in March, that colleges and universities are in a special relationship with their enrolled students which creates a limited duty to help, and protect, during school-sponsored activities over which the college has some measure of control.

The case is called The Regents of the Univ. of California v. Superior Court (decided March 22, 2018).  This one I have read and here is a summary:

The facts are long and detailed, but the short version of the story is that over more than a semester a certain UCLA student suffered from hallucinations and other mental health issues and behaved erratically and threateningly toward other students.  The problematic behavior was known to other students, TAs, professors, and members of the administration of the university.  The administration took action to help the students involved, including moving the problematic student off his dorm, and providing counseling.  The student was cooperative at times, but not consistently.  Sometimes he attended counseling, sometimes he did not.  Sometimes he took medication, sometimes he did not, and so on.

Again, there are more details to the story, but to make it short, one day at the end of class in a a science lab, the student unexpectedly and without provocation attacked another student (the plaintiff in the case) with a knife, causing her severe injuries.

The plaintiff sued the attacker and UCLA.  Against UCLA, she argued that the university owed her several duties:  (1) a duty to take reasonable protective measures to ensure her safety against violent attacks and otherwise protect her from reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct; (2) a duty to warn her as to such reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct on its campus and in its buildings; and, (3) a duty to control the reasonably foreseeable wrongful acts of third parties/other students.  In the alternative, she argued that even if UCLA did not owe those duties to her based on the special relationship, UCLA had assumed a duty of care by undertaking to provide campus-wide security.  (Because the court found that UCLA did owe a duty based on the special relationship, this last argument was not addressed.)

UCLA filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that colleges have no duty to protect their adult students from criminal acts but the Trial Court denied it.  On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeal reversed.  The dissenting judge opined that colleges have a special relationship with their enrolled students, “at least when the student is in a classroom under the direct supervision of an instructor” and that, therefore, colleges have duty to protect against foreseeable threats of violence in classroom.

The plaintiffs appealed and the state supreme court agreed with the dissenting judge holding that there is a duty to protect, although there is no duty to control.

The Court's opinion starts by reviewing the general rule and the exceptions to the notion of a duty to help.  Thus, the court is clear that there is no duty to help unless the plaintiff can establish that the defendant had a special relationship toward the plaintiff that justifies imposing a duty on the defendant.  Such a relationship would be characterized by dependency and control: one party depends on the other for protection and the other has the ability to provide control over that needed protection.  The court also explains even if there is a duty, the duty must be limited.  It can't be a duty owed to the public at large; it is owed only to those to whom the special relationship applies.

With this as the general background, the court compared the circumstances of the case to those of cases involving high schools because it has already been decided that high school do have a duty to protect students.

The court admitted that there are differences between high schools and colleges but decided the relationship between a university and its students still justifies finding that a duty is owed.

The cases involving high schools have held that there is duty owed because the relationship between the school and the students is characterized by mandatory character of school attendance and comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel.  Even though in the college setting, the students have more freedom and are usually not minors, the court found that students are still somewhat vulnerable because, although they are not minors, they are still learning how to navigate the world as adults and are, therefore, dependent on their college communities to provide structure, guidance, and a safe learning environment.

Given this conclusion, and the fact that colleges have superior control over the college community environment and the ability to protect students, including by monitoring and disciplining them if necessary, the court concluded that it is justified to find that colleges have a special relationship with their students.

However, the fact that there is a special relationship does not mean there is a duty to everyone or to eliminate all risks.  The court concluded that colleges are in a special relationship with their enrolled students only, and limited to the context of school-sponsored activities over which the college has some measure of control.  The court also noted that this duty is not a duty to prevent violence, which would be impossible to discharge.  It is a duty to take reasonable steps to protect students when the university becomes aware of a foreseeable threat to their safety.

Applying its conclusions to the facts of the case, the court remanded the case for the Court of Appeal to decide whether triable issues of material fact remain on the questions of breach of the duty (alerting to the fact that the appropriate standard of care for judging reasonableness of university’s actions remains an open question, which parties are free to litigate on remand.)

Thus, UCLA lost the argument on whether the court should impose a duty, but it is possible that UCLA will not be liable if it is determined that it did not breach the duty.

In a separate Concurring Opinion, one of the justices makes a very good point:  the language used by the court may be a bit too broad.

For a few reasons, this justice did not join the majority opinion insofar as it would extend the duty beyond the classroom, to encompass more broadly “curricular activities” and activities “closely related to [the] delivery of educational services.”   First, there is no need to decide if the duty extends beyond the classroom, because the attack in this case occurred in a classroom.  Second, the extent of a university’s control in a non-classroom setting varies considerably because activities outside the classroom differ in potentially significant ways. And, third, the majority’s conclusion can create confusion because it offers no guidance as to which non-classroom activities qualify as either “curricular” or “closely related to [the] delivery of educational services” or what factors are relevant to this determination.

Court holds coffee manufacturers must add a cancer warning label in California

Smithsonian magazine is reporting that coffee companies in California may soon be required to display a warning label alerting customers to a possible carcinogen in their brews.  Coffee contains acrylamide, which is on California’s list of chemicals that require a warning.  The ABA Journal also has the story (and more links) here. 

On the other hand, it has been reported that drinking coffee helps decrease the risk of many cancers.  I have a feeling this is not the last we will hear of this controversy.