Puerto Rico Senate adopts bill to eliminate joint and several liability

 About two weeks ago, the Puerto Rico Senate approved a bill to undo over 120 years worth of precedents and eliminate joint and several liability in Torts cases.  

If you have followed this blog for some time, or are familiar with my work, you won’t be surprised to know that I think this is a bad result.  I have, in fact, authored several law review and law journal articles in defense of joint and several liability.

Interestingly, even though some people think that law review articles are irrelevant and that no one reads them, the preamble to this new bill cites two of those articles of mine and includes a long quote from one of them.  In both articles I explained why it is a bad idea to do what the bill does, but I guess the authors of the bill thought their project would not be convincing unless they explicitly tried to refute my work. 

This is not the first time that lawmakers have tried to eliminate joint and several liability in Puerto Rico.  Most recently, it had been part of the proposal for a new Civil Code in the early 2000s and then again in 2019-2020.  For good reasons, though, both times, the propoal was quickly defeated and did not make it to the new code.

Yet, now, with the backing of the insurance industry, and to the detriment of future injured plaintiffs, they got the bill through the Senate and it now awaits the Governor’s signature.  I heard there is a group of law professors trying to convince the Governor not to sign it, but I don’t know what to expect.  

If you can read Spanish you can take a look at the bill here.

Alaska reiterates its approach to bystander emotional distress claims, which is very different than the one used in most other jurisdictions

As you probably know, back in 1968 the California Supreme Court created what has now become the majority approach to claims by people who suffer emotional distress at witnessing injuries suffered by others.  According to that approach, the claim is limited to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim, are present at the scene of the accident and who have a contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident.  Someone who is told about an accident after it happens or who arrives at the scene only to observe the aftermath, would not have a claim.

Alaska, however, never adopted the requirement of the contemporaneous sensory observance.  According to this approach, the plaintiff can support a claim as long as he or she is a close relative of the victim and that, under the circumstances, it is reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress.  This means the notion of duty in Alaska in these types of cases is broader and defendants are exposed to liability in many more cases.

I am writing about this today because I just read that the Alaska Supreme Court has again reiterated its approach to this issue in a new case called Doan v. Banner Health, Inc., (available in Westlaw at 2019 WL 2312537).

In this case, a mother, who was in a hospital waiting room when her daughter died, brought a NIED claim against medical providers for the distress she suffered upon seeing her daughter’s body. 

This claim would have been rejected in any state that follows the California approach and, obviously, in all states that reject it in favor of the "zone of danger" approach.  To my knowledge, this leaves only Alaska and Puerto Rico.

Thanks to the TortsProf blog for the update.