Not surprisingly, Court dismisses Patrick Reed's defamation suit - UPDATE: Court of Appeals also dismisses appeal

October 5, 2023

Back in August of last year I reported that professional golfer Patrick Reed filed a defamation claim against a number of defendants including commentators for the Golf Channel, and I explained how the complaint was a good model to teach how NOT to  draft a complaint.  See here.

The complaint was based on obviously wrong arguments and I predicted it would be dismissed.  My prediction was correct and the case was dismissed in November.  But the dismissal was without prejudice and, thus, Reed and his lawyers were given a chance to amend the complaint and try again.

They shouldn't have because, as I argued back then, the claim was flawed from the start; but they did.  

And, predictably, they lost again.  As expected, the court found that the alleged defamatory statements were either not defamatory, rhetorical hyperbole, true or substantially true, or statements of opinion.

You can read the opinion, which is pretty detailed and long, here.

UPDATE:  July 11, 2025 

Courthouse News Service is reporting today that the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has (again, predictably) dismissed the appeal.  Go here for more on the story and a link to the one page order. 

Follow up on the possible criminal liability of a parent

 A few days ago I posted a comment on the ongoing prosecution of the mother of a child who engaged in a mass shooting at a school.  The case is a criminal prosecution but some of the issues are similar and relevant for tort law because they involve the possibility of imposing vicarious liability (which is not what is being charged) and the underlying issue of causation (which is very much at issue in the case).  

I am following up on this today because Joseph Margulies. a Professor of Government at Cornell University, recently published a comment on these issues over at Justicia. In it he points out, correctly, that one important issue in the case (as in a torts case) is the question of proximate cause and, although he does not mention it by name, the question of duty.  And, in the end, he questions whether it would be a good idea to impose a duty on parents that could result in criminal liability under the circumstances of the case.  The comment is short and you can read it here.  

News reports that a case in Michigan will decide if parents can be criminally responsible for a child's actions are wrong

 If you have been paying attention to the news, you may have heard that a criminal case is just underway in Michigan in which the mother of a child who killed a number students in a school shooting spree is on trial for involuntary manslaughter.  And, you may have noticed that an often repeated version of the story is that the case is about whether parents can be held responsible for the conduct of their child.

This formulation of the issue is wrong.  

The parents are not on trial for the conduct of their child.  That would mean that the state is looking to convict them based on vicarious liability.  Instead, the parents are on trial for their own conduct, which led to and resulted in the conduct of the child.  That's very different.  In other words, the parents are being tried for direct (as opposed to vicarious) liability.  They are not facing convictions "for the conduct of their child"; they are facing conviction for their own conduct.

Now, before we go any further, let's remember that this case is a criminal case, not a torts case.  But the implications of the possible liability of a parent for the results of the conduct of a child are obviously important for tort law.

In torts, parents are typically not held vicariously liable for the conduct of their children.  But they can be held liable for their own conduct if their conduct is a cause that leads to the injury of the plaintiff. Thus, the principle at issue is the same.  

However, making the case for tort liability is easier.  There seems to be pretty solid support for the arguments of all the elements of the cause of action, including proximate cause since it is relatively easy to argue that the injury was a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct, which included giving the child a gun knowing the child was mentally unstable.  Of course, the defendant will argue that the conduct of the child was a superseding cause, but the argument will come down to whether the child's conduct was unforeseeable, and there is good support to defeat that argument.

BUT back to the actual case in Michigan, what is different is that for criminal liability, the conduct in question must have been defined as a crime by the penal law.  And that is the issue in the criminal case.  The state is trying to extend the definition of manslaughter to include the conduct of the parents which allegedly "facilitated" the manslaughter committed by the child.  This creates the confusion.  Rather than charge the parents for the "facilitation" of the crime, or with a crime like "reckless endangerment" or aiding and abetting or something like that, the state is charging the parents with the actual manslaughter.  

Whether that is the proper charge given the evidence is a matter of criminal law about which I am not an expert.  But the issue was argued before the court.  The court held against the parents, and was affirmed by two higher courts on appeal.  Here is the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals which holds that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the child's decision to shoot four classmates was not a superseding cause because it was foreseeable.

Interestingly, take a look at the finding of the trial court on the issue, which if you did not know otherwise you would think was taken from a torts case (other than the reference to "as alleged by the People"):

The Court concludes that sufficient evidence has been presented to allow a reasonable juror to find factual causation and to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the deaths of the victims were a direct and natural result of the Defendants’ gross negligence.  The Court further concludes that the criminal misconduct of the Defendants’ son was an intervening cause but that a reasonable juror could conclude that his actions were reasonably foreseeable.  Therefore, the causal link between Defendants’ actions and their liability for the deaths of the victims, as alleged by the People, is not severed by the actions of their son.  A reasonable juror could conclude that the action of the Defendants’ son was a related link in the causal chain. 

According to the news, the case is the first instance in which a parent is charged (for her own conduct) with the crime that corresponds to the conduct of the child.  Not too long ago, the mother of a 6-year-old who shot a teacher was tried in relation to the incident, but she was tried (and convicted) of child neglect, not with the crime that would correspond to the conduct of the child -- which is what the prosecutors are trying to do in Michigan.

The case is clearly an attempt to send a message and put pressure on parents to take better care or control of a child when there are signs that the child needs it.  This may start a trend in prosecutions and it may influence how courts deal with similar issues in torts cases. 

You can read coverage about the case here:

NPR (audio)

The Hill (includes video)

The Hill (includes video of the opening statements)

Idaho joins the modern trend that requires proof of "the case within the case" in legal malpractice cases based on alleged negligence in litigation

 I have to confess that I assumed that, as part of the analysis of cause in fact, all states required a plaintiff in a legal malpractice cased based on alleged negligence in handling the litigation of case to argue that they would have won "the case within the case" (or, in other words, that they would have won the underlying case had it not been for the negligent conduct of the defendant lawyer).  But it turns out that until recently, Idaho apparently did not require this.  Now they do.

Last week, the Legal Profession Blog reported that the Idaho Supreme Court decided a case in which it rejected a standard that the suing plaintiff only had to show "some chance of success" in the underlying medical malpractice case.  In doing so, the Court adopted the much more popular test of requiring the plaintiff to show that they would have won the underlying case (had it not been for the negligent conduct of the defendant lawyer).  This analysis is usually referred to as the "case within the case" analysis because it requires the plaintiff to show that they would have won the underlying (old) case in order to be able to win the new case they are litigating.  (Note that the court apparently says that showing the case within the case is needed to meet the element of proximate cause, although it is more accurate to say it relates to cause in fact.)

Meeting the case within the case standard makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to support their claim but it is the logical analysis that is consistent with the notion of cause in fact.  And, like I said, I always thought it was "universally" accepted, but now I see I was wrong about that.  

So I wonder if there are any other states that still recognize a cause of action without requiring that the plaintiff meet the "case within the case" approach.  Do you know of any?  

The case is called Rich v. Hepworth Holzer and you can read the opinion here.

Golf and how not to plead a defamation claim -- UPDATED

August 26, 2022

Long time readers of this blog know that over the years I have posted many stories about golf related torts.  Go here and scroll down to see them.  Most of them relate to cases in which a golfer's negligence results in damages to another golfer or to a nearby property owner.  So today I bring you a golf story of a different sort.

If you know anything about professional golf, you know that there is a huge to do about the fact that a new professional tour (funded by Saudi Arabia) has been created to compete directly against the American PGA tour.  When a good number of top, established, PGA pro players signed to play with the LIV tour, the PGA banned them from playing in PGA events and the debate about the new tour started to get heated.

The availability of the LIV tour now threatens the PGA's control of the pro tour and its players, and the reaction to the competition has been very fierce on both sides.  PGA faithful players and commentators have spoken publicly against the players who defected to the LIV tour.  Players who defected have accused the PGA of many things...  etc.... ...  Insults and accusations are being thrown in all directions. ... You get the idea.

Enter Patrick Reed, a pro golfer who recently decided to leave the PGA and join the LIV tour.  For this, one of the commentators of the Golf Channel criticized him (and others) strongly over a series of broadcasts and Reed has now filed a claim for defamation.

That was a long intro for me to get to my point today.  If you want to learn how NOT to draft (or argue) a defamation claim, read the complaint now.

Here are some of the problems I see with the complaint. First, because of his celebrity golfer status the plaintiff will likely be considered a public figure so he has to meet a higher burden of proof against the defendants, who are members of the press.  Second, the complaint is full of conclusory statements characterizing the statements upon which it is based as "defamatory" with weak explanations as to how that conclusion is supported.  This is a problem because as alleged it is easy to point out that the vast majority, if not all, of the statements in question are not actionable because they are either statements of opinion (as opposed to statements of fact), insults or permissible hyperbole.  

And then there is the chance that maybe the judge could be convinced that the plaintiff is actually "libel proof" since his reputation is, well, not the best among many.  You can read more about the case and about Reed and his reputation here.  (As the author of that article says "It was a chain of suspicious incidents involving Reed and his golf ball, however, that smudged his image with a mark no eraser can fully eradicate.")

The complaint does have some statements that could be considered statements of fact (I think the point is debatable but I can see a judge not dismissing them for now) all of which relate to incidents in 2019 and 2021... and about those I wonder if they are affected by a statute of limitations.  

I am very interested in this case and I would like to see if the defendants file a motion to dismiss.  I would, and I think most if not all of the claims should be dismissed.  

---------------------------------

UPDATE (11-27-22):  In my original post I commented on how poorly the complaint in this case was drafted.  Not surprisingly, the court agreed and dismissed it.  The dismissal is without prejudice, so it is possible the plaintiff's lawyer may be able to fix it, but we will have to wait and see.  Here is the dismissal order.

I found out about the dismissal in the Golf Dispute Resolution blog, which includes a short comment that starts as follows: 

I typically question the wisdom of a public person with a questionable past filing a suit for defamation. The essence of defamation is damage to reputation. Thus, by commencing such a claim, plaintiffs invite inquiry into all aspects of their past. The damage calculation in many respects is a gap analysis: what is the difference between the reputation with and without the allegedly defamatory statements. A defamation claim can be the legal system’s warning that those living in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.

Thus, like many, I was puzzled with Patrick Reed elected to take on Golf Channel and its media talent, Brandel Chamblee and Damon Hack, with claims that they had defamed him. Certainly, Reed’s history–including longstanding stories about alienation from his parents, issues with teammates during his college career, more recent suggestions that his on course professional play has included incidents of cheating–paint a large target on his back for defense lawyers eager to challenge claims that the broadcasters have damaged Reed’s reputation.

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UPDATE #2:  October, 2023

After the original complaint was dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiff filed a new complaint to try again.  They should not have since the basis of the claim was flawed, but they did.  And predictably, the case was dismissed again.  Go here for the story.

Strangely worded opinion in Indiana recognizes cause of action for emotional distress resulting from sexual abuse of a child, ... maybe?

A few days ago, the TortProf Blog reported that "[t]he Indiana Supreme Court has extended negligent infliction of emotional distress."  In K.G. v. Smith, 2021 WL 6063878, at **1, 8, 2021 Ind. LEXIS 775, at *2, 23-24 (Ind. 2021), the court apparently recognizes a cause of action for the parents of a child who claim emotional distress from learning that a caretaker for their child sexually abused the child.  However, the opinion is very awkwardly worded.  It states that 

"[W]hen a caretaker assumes responsibility for a child, and when that caretaker owes a duty of care to the child's parent or guardian, a claim against the caretaker for the negligent infliction of emotional distress may proceed when the parent or guardian later discovers, with irrefutable certainty, that the caretaker sexually abused that child and when that abuse severely impacted the parent or guardian's emotional health.”; “To satisfy this rule, the parent or guardian must show (A) that the tortfeasor had a duty of care to the parent or guardian; (B) that there is irrefutable certainty of the act's commission; (C) that the tortious act is one rarely, if ever, witnessed by the parent or guardian; and (D) that the abuse severely impacted the parent or guardian's emotional health."

Here is my problem with this.  Notice how the court does not say that the caretaker owes a duty to the parents.  It says that IF the caretaker owes a duty to the parent.  This means that to support a prima facie case, the parents will have to convince the court that the caretaker owes them a duty.  And, the parents will have to do this in addition to meeting all the other elements of the cause of action.  

In other words, the key here is that the parents have to show that the caretaker owed them a duty, but the court does not say how a parent can satisfy the element of duty in such a case.   Unless I am missing something, this adds nothing to what we already knew.  To have a cause of action, the plaintiff always has to show the element of duty.

My guess is that the parents will have to find a way to convince the courts to adopt the view of the Restatement 3d §47(b) which recognizes a possible claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the relationship between the parties.  

Trial related to destroyed frozen embryos raises interesting questions -- UPDATED again

This story is updated below, at the end of the original post

I just read a story on Courthouse News on a trial in which the plaintiffs are suing the manufacturer of cryogenic tanks that somehow failed causing the destruction of thousands of frozen eggs and embryos, which according to the plaintiffs dashed some families’ only hope of having biological children.

The plaintiffs' claim is for product liability based on the alleged defective design of the tanks.  The defendant, however, is apparently going to argue that the tank's failure was due to the misuse of the product by the Fertility Center which used it.  This is the first interesting point in the case because that argument is essentially claiming that the conduct of the Fertility Clinic was an unforeseeable intervening (and therefore superseding) cause.  

Yet, the most interesting question raised by this case relates to the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs.  The story states that the claims "for the loss of eggs and embryos" were sent to private arbitration.

So, my first question is what is a claim for the "loss of" the eggs and embryos?   I am assuming "embryos" refers to fertilized eggs, while eggs are not fertilized.  If that is the case, there can be no claim for wrongful death for the loss of the eggs in any jurisdiction I know of.  And for the loss of the embryos, there can be a wrongful death claim only in jurisdictions that recognize that life begins at conception for purposes of the wrongful death act.  So I wonder if the claim is not for wrongful death but for something else?  Is it just a contracts dispute then?  I just don' know.

On the other hand, maybe the claim is for emotional distress, but that claim would depend on the jurisdiction's approach to those claims?  If the jurisdiction requires impact, I don't think there is support for the claim, for example.  Also, the facts don't seem to fit a claim for emotional distress of a bystander.  

Since the case is already at trial, I guess these questions were resolved already through motions to dismiss, etc.  But I wonder what the answers are.  

UPDATE May 30, 2021:  Courthouse News is following the trial closely.  This week they published the following stories:

On May 26:  Lab Workers Were ‘Devastated’ by Tank Failure That Destroyed Human Embryos

On May 27:  Tank Manufacturer Accuses Fertility Clinic of Falsifying Data in Frozen Eggs Trial 

June 6: Fertility Patients Describe Sadness and Anger After Freezer Tank Failure

June 9: Jurors Asked to Award $30 Million for Lost Eggs and Embryos

June 10: Jury Finds Tank Maker Responsible for Lost Eggs and Embryos, Awards $15 Million

June 12: Loss of Embryos and Eggs at Fertility Clinic Leads to Groundbreaking Multi-Million Dollar Verdict in California

June 20: $15 Million Verdict Against IVF Cryopreservation Tank Maker Is Big News

Cause of action for second hand Covid?

Back in 2016, there were a number of multi-million dollar verdicts in cases involving second hand exposure to asbestos that addressed the issue of whether an employer should be liable to the family members of an employee who brought home asbestos on their clothes.  See here, here, here and here.

The same issue is now back in the news thanks to a a couple of lawsuits filed by the spouses of people who contracted COVID-19 at work and then infected the plaintiffs' at home.

As I explained back then, in the asbestos cases, defendants typically would argue that liability should be limited to the injury to the person who was exposed directly.  Otherwise, any bystander who came in contact with this person could sue.   

It is not a frivolous argument, but courts in the asbestos cases were able to avoid it by limiting possible liability to the spouses of the workers who had been directly exposed to asbestos.

According to this story in the ABA Journal, two complaints arguing COVID related injuries have been filed already and more are expected. 

Liability waivers in the age of the novel coronavirus

The ABA Journal has published a short article on issues related to the use of liability waivers in the age of the novel coronavirus.  You can read it here.

Texas Supreme Court reiterates that former criminal defendants suing their lawyers for negligence must prove actual innocence, even after exoneration

Long time readers of this blog may remember that I have posted many stories commenting on the fact that many (probably most) jurisdictions require former criminal defendants to prove actual innocence as a requirement to support malpractice claims against their criminal defense counsel. (Go here and scroll down for stories on this.)  In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have rejected this notion, but it still seems to be the majority approach. 

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed its position on this in a case called Gray v. Skelton, which you can read here.

What makes this case interesting is that it clarifies that merely getting a conviction reversed, or being "exonerated" is not, by itself, enough to show actual innocence.  As the court explains, 

...exoneration . . . requires not only that the underlying criminal conviction be vacated but also proof of innocence. Innocence, however, can be established in more than one way. It can be established in the underlying criminal proceeding when the conviction is vacated on an actual-innocence finding. . . .Or, if the conviction is vacated on other grounds, formerly convicted individuals may prove their innocence in their malpractice suit against their criminal-defense attorneys. 

Article on possible negligence claims and liability for mishandling of matters related to the coronavirus

On March 9, 2020, a couple quarantined on the Grand Princess cruise ship, sued Princess Cruise Lines Ltd. after docking in Oakland, CA. This case marks the first negligence lawsuit filed in direct response to the rising coronavirus epidemic gripping the world. 

There are sure more claims to follow.  Here is a short comment that previews some of the issues.

Connecticut Supreme Court adopts "alternative liability doctrine"

Assume that three men enter an abandoned building without permission.  While there, they drink alcohol and smoke cigarettes.  One of them fails to extinguish a cigarette, which starts a fire that spreads quickly and destroys the building.  As a result, the owners of the building sue the men but then realize they can’t prove which of the three defendants actually caused the fire.  Assuming it is true that only one of the three men caused the fire, none of them should not be liable since the plaintiff has the burden to show that a defendant's conduct caused their injury, right?

Does that sound familiar?  Does it sound like a law school hypo?  Of course it does, because it is essentially the question every law school student talks about when discussing the famous case Summers v. Tice, which you probably don’t remember by name but you do remember the facts:  two hunters shoot in the direction of the plaintiff.  Only one of them hits him, but the plaintiff could not identify which one.  In that case, the court decided to impose liability on both (unless either one could prove they were not the cause of the injury) as if they had both committed the act. 

I am writing today about this because just a few days ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided to adopt this same approach and apply it to the case with the fire in the building scenario. 

In doing so, the Court explained how the new rule (sometimes referred to as “alternative liability”) would be applied: 

“...the rule applies only when the plaintiff can demonstrate, first, that all of the defendants acted negligently and harm resulted, second, that all possible tortfeasors have been named as defendants, and, third, that the tortfeasors’ negligent conduct was substantially simultaneous in time and of the same character so as to create the same risk of harm.”

When these three threshold requirements are met, the alternative liability doctrine has been recognized as a limited exception to the general rule that the plaintiff must prove that each of the defendants caused the plaintiff’s harm.

As in Summers, the Court admits that adopting this approach can result in the imposition of liability on a defendant who was actually not at fault.  Yet, it is better to be unfair to a negligent defendant than to leave an innocent plaintiff without a remedy.  As the Court states, “[f]aced with the choice of leaving an injured plaintiff without a remedy, on the one hand, or requiring two wrongdoers, both of whom had acted negligently toward the plaintiff and had created the situation [in which the] plaintiff was injured, [to] bear the burden of absolving themselves on the other, it seems clear that the latter approach represents the fairer, more sensible alternative.”

I should note that the term "alternative liability" is very unfortunate because it suggests that the result of the application of the doctrine is liability, when in fact it isn't.  The result is to allow the plaintiff to support the element of causation without the type of proof that is typically required for it.  If we are going to be technically correct, we could say the doctrine is an "alternative proof of causation" doctrine.

The case is called Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency and Town of Somers v. Jackson and you can read it here.

Recent Tennessee case holds suicide is a superseding cause

A couple of days ago I posted a comment about a couple of recent claims based on deaths by suicide.  Sadly suicide is a serious health issue.  There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenth-leading cause of death in the country, which raises an interesting question for courts:  if the risk of suicide is known, can it be said that someone committing suicide is always unforeseeable?

I have published many stories on the issues raised by claims based on suicide over the years.  You can go here and scroll down to read them.  In a recent one I commented on an article that argues it is time to change the way courts approach suicide as a superseding cause that eliminates the right of a plaintiff to recovery -- a view I happen to agree with.

I am writing about this today because I just read about a new opinion out of Tennessee that provides the most recent and fairly comprehensive discussion on whether the act of committing suicide should be considered to be a superseding cause.  The case is called Cotten v. Wilson and you can read the opinion here.

As you may know already, some jurisdictions consider suicide a superseding cause per se, in all cases, while others presume it is a superseding but would consider evidence to support the claim that the presumption should be defeated.

Tennessee appears to be in the second camp.  According to the case, courts in Tennessee have generally held that suicide will be deemed a superseding cause of death if it was ‘a willful, calculated, and deliberate act of one who has the power of choice based on the notion that no reasonable person could foresee that a rational person would intentionally choose to commit suicide. But, courts would consider the conduct foreseeable under different circumstances including (1) where it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct will cause a mental condition in the decedent that would lead to the self-destructive act, (2) where the suicide occurs in a custodial context, (3) where there was a special relationship between the defendant and decedent, and (4) situations in which the defendant facilitated the suicide by supplying the decedent with the means to carry it out.

The case involved a woman and a psychiatrist who had been in a relationship.  The psychiatrist knew that the woman had attempted to commit suicide in the past, but nevertheless allowed her to stay in his home alone with an unsecured gun.

It seems to me that it is not too far fetched to argue that suicide could be considered to be foreseeable under those circumstances.  Yet, the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the claim holding that the “suicide constitutes a superseding intervening event that breaks the chain of proximate causation.”  One judge filed a dissenting opinion, which you can read here.

Utah holds criminal defendant does not have to show actual innocence to support malpractice claim against lawyer

As you probably know, jurisdiction are divided on the issue of whether a convicted criminal defendant should be required to show actual innocence as a requirement to support a malpractice claim against his or her former criminal defense lawyer.

I recently wrote that Mississippi and Kentucky adopted an exoneration requirement, while Iowa and Idaho rejected it.  (For more stories on the issue, go here and scroll down.)

Today I am writing about this because I just read that the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed and clarified its holding that a criminal defendant can sue counsel for malpractice without proving actual innocence in a case called Paxman v King, available here.

The Legal Profession Blog has more details here.

Should a doctor be subject to liability to non-patients who suffer an injury because of negligence toward a patient?

Suppose a doctor misdiagnoses a contagious condition on a patient, and the patient then causes an injury to a third person.  Should the third person have a cause of action against the doctor?  This is a question that has been addressed by a number of cases, many of them involving sexually transmitted diseases.

Now, in a case called Jane Doe v Charles Cochran, available here, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a doctor may be liable to a third party infected with an STD after the doctor had mistakenly informed the patient he was free of infection.

Two judges dissented, here, arguing that it is wrong to extend the duty of the doctor to include non-patients.

Podcast on internet defamation

The most recent edition of the podcast "Digital Detectives" is devoted to a discussion of what lawyers need to look out for when handling a defamation case that originates in comments made on the internet.  You can listen to the program by going here.

Supreme Court finds manufacturer can be sued under maritime law for exposure to asbestos even if product is modified by a third party as long as defendant knows of modification

Back in October of last year I wrote that the US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case that raises basic principles of tort law as related to maritime jurisdiction.  The case involves equipment that depended on asbestos insulation sold by various manufacturers that was installed many years ago on Navy ships.  The plaintiffs are a group of sailors injured by the asbestos used with the equipment.

Last week, the Court announced its decision ruling that, under maritime law, manufacturers can be sued for the injuries caused by their products even if the products were modified by third parties as long as those modifications were known by the manufacturer.

As reported in Jurist:

The suit was brought by two veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries, who alleged that they were exposed to asbestos while enlisted and developed terminal cancer as a result. The defendants manufactured equipment for ships for the US Navy, on which the plaintiffs served. Though the equipment was not produced with asbestos by the defendants, integration of the carcinogen was performed by the Navy after the installation of the equipment pursuant to instructions by the manufacturers. The suit argued that the two crewmembers were not given sufficient notice that they were being exposed to a dangerous material by the manufacturer, while the companies claimed that they were not liable because they did not install the asbestos materials themselves. Though a federal district court ruled in favor of the manufacturers, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, after which the manufacturers appealed to the Supreme Court.

In a 6-3 decision, Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote that there were three different approaches that the court could take to constrain defendant liability in maritime product liability law. The first, a forseeability approach, would require manufacturers to anyone who came into contact with their product of any dangers that could be reasonably caused by their equipment, even if it is modified by a third party. Kavanaugh dismissed this test, stating that it would cause “confusion” and “overdisclosure” while being a substantial burden. The second test, the “bare-metal” defense asserted by the defendants, would prevent manufacturers from being held liable for any modifications undertaken by a third party. Kavanaugh stated that this test “goes too far in the opposite direction” from the forseeability test, allowing manufacturers to wash their hands of dangerous products by hiding behind third parties. The court therefore held that a middle-ground test is appropriate, holding manufacturers responsible for harm caused by third-party modifications that are undertaken with the manufacturer’s “knowledge or intention” that such a modification would make the product dangerous.

The case is called Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries , and you can read the opinion here.  You can read other documents relevant to the case here.

The SCotUS blog has analysis here.

Shooting victims argue on appeal to revive case against social media platforms

In a recent oral argument before the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, attorneys for some victims and family members of those killed during the 2016 shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando argued that the court should reverse a lower court decision dismissing a complaint against Twitter and other social media platforms.

In the original lawsuit, the plaintiffs argued that but for the postings of a radical group using defendants’ social media platforms, the shooter would not have engaged in his attack on the Pulse nightclub.  They alleged Twitter, Google and Facebook knew their sites and platforms were being used by terrorist organizations to raise money and recruit new members, but did nothing to curb or end the activity.

The lower court judge, however, ruled in favor of the defendants and granted their motion to dismiss in March 2018.

You can read a summary of the argument here. 

I confess I have not been following this story and do not know the details of the allegations or the lower court opinion; but from what I can gather from the summary, it seems to me the plaintiffs will have a hard time winning the argument.  It is not easy to hold the media responsible for the criminal conduct of others who read or react to what is published in the media platforms.

Mississippi and Kentucky adopt exoneration requirement for malpractice claims against criminal defense attorneys

Some jurisdictions have recently abandoned the view that a convicted criminal defendant who wants to recover for malpractice against his or her former lawyer has to prove that he or she was actually innocent of the crime for which they were convicted.  My most recent post on this is here.   Some of those, however, still require that the plaintiffs show they were exonerated through the criminal process (or what some call "post conviction relief").  In other words, in cases in which a convicted defendant wants to sue a former lawyer alleging they would not have been convicted but for the negligence of the lawyer there are three approaches:  requiring that the defendant show actual innocence, requiring that the defendant show post conviction relief (but not necessarily innocence) and not requiring anything other than the typical elements of a torts claim.

In two recent decisions, the Supreme Courts of Mississippi and Kentucky have decided to adopt the approach that requires "exoneration" for the malpractice claim to proceed.

The case in Mississippi is called Trigg v. Farese, and you can read the opinion here.  In it, the court concludes that "We join the substantial majority of courts in holding that, because these allegations would entitle the plaintiff to relief from his underlying conviction, he must first pursue them through the criminal-justice process. In other words, a convict must “exonerate” himself by obtaining relief from his conviction or sentence before he may pursue a claim against his defense attorney for causing him to be convicted or sentenced more harshly than he should have been. To the extent prior decisions of this Court or the Court of Appeals suggest otherwise, they are overruled."

The case in Kentucky is called Lawrence v. Bingham, Greenbaum,Doll, LLP, and you can read the opinion here.  In it, the court adopted the following articulation of the Exoneration Rule: "to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a professional malpractice case against a criminal defense attorney, the convicted client must plead in his complaint that he has been exonerated of the underlying criminal conviction. He or she need not prove actual innocence, but they also may not rely solely upon a claim of actual innocence in the absence of an exonerating court decision through appeal or post-conviction order. Further, the statute of limitations on the legal malpractice claim does not begin to run until the postconviction exoneration occurs."

Iowa Supreme Court finds that proof of exoneration is not necessarily required for a convicted defendant to sue for legal malpractice

In a many jurisdictions, a convicted criminal defendant who wants to recover for malpractice against his or her former lawyer has to obtain post conviction relief and prove that he or she was actually innocent of the crime for which they were convicted. This view has been criticized but still appears to be the majority view. Yet, a number of jurisdictions have recently decided otherwise.

Back in 2016, I reported that the Iowa Supreme Court decided actual innocence is no longer required as an element of the cause of action; and I just saw that it recently reaffirmed this new approach in a case decided this year.  Here is the story which includes a link to the opinion.

Other jurisdictions that have held innocence is not a requirement include Washington, Kansas (also here) and Idaho.

UPDATE (4/15/2018):  Thanks to Patrick J. Olmstead, Jr. who wrote to me to let me know that the Indiana Court of Appeals also abandoned the actual innocence requirement in a case called Beal v. Blinn, 9 N.E.3d 694 (2014).