Interview about whether immunity for Covid-19 related injuries is a good idea

About a week ago I posted a comment about articles by Professor Tim Lytton on whether granting immunity for injuries related to Covid-19 is a good idea.  See here.

Here is an interview with Professor Lytton expanding on the subject:

Immunity backlash

A couple of days ago I posted a comment on why granting blanket immunity to businesses for injuries caused related to the Covid-19 virus is a bad idea. See here. Today the Pop Tort published a comment on the same topic with lots of links to articles and editorials arguing against immunity.  Go here to read the article.

Here are some of the editorials arguing that granting immunity is a bad idea:

The Boston Globe.

The New York Times.

Orlando Sun Sentinel.

San Francisco Chronicle.

Granting blanket immunity related to COVID-19 injuries is a bad idea

As  I am sure you know by now, some business have been cleared to open for business in many states and this has generated some debate as to whether those businesses should be granted immunity from possible liability if their employees or customers contract COVID-19 as a result.  The issue as to whether an employer is liable to an employee relates to the state's workers compensation system, so I will not comment on that.  I am more interested in the possibility of tort liability to customers.

On this issue, I agree with Professor Timothy D. Lytton, of Law (Georgia State University) who has authored two very good and short articles on the matter.  See here and here.

The rhetoric often used by organizations like the Chamber of Commerce to claim protection from "frivolous lawsuits" is not new and it has been used for a long time in attempts to limit, or even eliminate, the rights of injured parties to seek recovery for their injuries.  Like all so-called "tort reform" efforts, it is all part of an effort to make it more difficult, if not impossible, for injured parties to get recovery, or, if they can get recovery to limit the amount of recovery they can get.

Unfortunately, calls for such limits have already been heeded in New York, where the legislature enacted broad immunity for health care workers from medical malpractice claims during the COVID-19 crisis; and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has threatened that he will not allow another coronavirus bailout bill to pass the Senate unless it includes sweeping immunity from liability for businesses.  (For a comment on the issues before the Senate go here.)

Granting such immunity from civil liability is bad public policy and legislators should reject the idea.

I just recently read a report that some businesses in Wisconsin are refusing service to people who wear masks. Yes, you read that right.  Some business have signs that say masks are not allowed; others have threatened to call the police claiming the masked individuals are there to commit a robbery.

This attitude, fueled by ignorance and the insane idea that not wearing a mask is somehow an expression of resistance to government intrusion, is, in fact, purposely and with knowledge creating the possibility that customers will be exposed to a deadly virus.  Why should a business owner who purposely endangers the health of its customers be granted immunity?

The most basic principle upon which all of tort law is based is the notion of deterrence.  As we all know, the prospect of possible liability for our conduct is an incentive for us to act in ways that do not create unreasonable risks to others.

Why would it make sense to abandon this universally accepted principle now, at a time when it is clear that the conduct of businesses open to the public can create such high level of risks?  Add to that the fact that some of the more simple precautions that can be taken are simple and inexpensive and Learned Hand would be calling from his grave to remind us why it is that tort law works for the betterment of society.

As Prof. Lytton explains,

The prospect of lawsuits against businesses that fail to take proper precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is likely to focus business owners’ attention on exercising reasonable care to avoid liability for negligence. The various considerations that define the legal standard of reasonable care—cost-benefit analysis, emerging industry customs, public safety regulations, and common sense—applied in specific contexts by the people who know them best may make the reopening process more reflective and rational than if businesses rely solely on the changing or conflicting policy statements released by public officials.

In addition, as has been proven time and time again before the days of the pandemic in the debate related to tort reform, the fear that liability exposure will lead to a flood of litigation is unwarranted. The civil liability system places considerable obstacles on the prospect of frivolous litigation.

In addition, defendants will always have available defenses that can result in a reduction in the level of possible liability, or in the complete dismissal of the claims, including comparative negligence, assumption of the risk and, in a small handful of states, contributory negligence.

In the end, business owners should be encouraged to take reasonable precautions to protect their customers and their workers.   Liability insurers can play a part by making sure their customers (the business owners) know the need to take those precautions.

In contrast, granting blanket immunity to businesses will encourage them to be less mindful of taking reasonable precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission as they face growing financial pressure to reopen.  Customers, workers, everyone who comes in contact with them, the economic system, and society in general will suffer as a result.

In response to arguments like the ones I have expressed here, some say that immunity should be granted only in cases of negligence, not in cases of "gross negligence."  Ok, that sounds reasonable...  until you consider the relevant law.

You see, "gross negligence" is not a theory of liability in tort law.  It is just a way to describe a high degree of negligence.  And, whether the conduct of a defendant will be considered "gross" is usually a matter of fact for the jury to decide.

In addition, at one point U.S. Chamber of Commerce Executive Vice President and Chief Policy Officer Neil Bradley told National Public Radio that the Chamber is not asking for blanket immunity, but "a safe harbor ... against frivolous lawsuits."  This is nonsense.  If that is all they want, they don't need to do anything.  Filing frivolous lawsuits will subject the plaintiff's lawyer to sanctions both under the rules of civil procedure and the rules of professional responsibility.

For more on the debate on whether to grant immunity to businesses for injuries related to Covid-19 go here. here and here.

Texas Supreme Court reiterates that former criminal defendants suing their lawyers for negligence must prove actual innocence, even after exoneration

Long time readers of this blog may remember that I have posted many stories commenting on the fact that many (probably most) jurisdictions require former criminal defendants to prove actual innocence as a requirement to support malpractice claims against their criminal defense counsel. (Go here and scroll down for stories on this.)  In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have rejected this notion, but it still seems to be the majority approach. 

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed its position on this in a case called Gray v. Skelton, which you can read here.

What makes this case interesting is that it clarifies that merely getting a conviction reversed, or being "exonerated" is not, by itself, enough to show actual innocence.  As the court explains, 

...exoneration . . . requires not only that the underlying criminal conviction be vacated but also proof of innocence. Innocence, however, can be established in more than one way. It can be established in the underlying criminal proceeding when the conviction is vacated on an actual-innocence finding. . . .Or, if the conviction is vacated on other grounds, formerly convicted individuals may prove their innocence in their malpractice suit against their criminal-defense attorneys. 

Should a plaintiff always need an expert witness in a malpractice case?

Because the practice of law is considered to be a profession, and a profession is defined, among other things by the fact that it requires special knowledge, education and training, courts usually require that plaintiffs in malpractice actions provide an expert witness to support their arguments as to duty and breach to the jury.  But what if there is no jury?  What if the case is going to be a bench trial?  Should a plaintiff be required to have an expert to explain to the judge what the standard of care of the profession is?  Or can we assume that the judge - obviously a lawyer himself or herself - knows the law that applies to the practice of the profession they belong to?

In a recent case in Delaware (Cannon v. Poliquin), the court decide no help from an expert is needed.  Go here for a short summary.

Article on possible negligence claims and liability for mishandling of matters related to the coronavirus

On March 9, 2020, a couple quarantined on the Grand Princess cruise ship, sued Princess Cruise Lines Ltd. after docking in Oakland, CA. This case marks the first negligence lawsuit filed in direct response to the rising coronavirus epidemic gripping the world. 

There are sure more claims to follow.  Here is a short comment that previews some of the issues.

Trump campaign sues CNN

A few days ago, I reported that the Trump campaign had filed lawsuits against the NY Times and the Washington Post (here and here).  Today, the news is that they have followed up with a case against CNN.  TechDirt, which has referred to the claims as "laughable SLAPP suits" has the story here.

Trump campaign sues Washington Post

Last week I commented on the fact that the Trump campaign had filed a claim against the New York Times for defamation based on an Op-Ed piece.  See here.

Today I am here to tell you that they are at it again, having filed another (essentially the same) lawsuit this time against the Washington Post.

Marking what he calls a "less than noble moment," one commentator concludes that "the lawsuit is weak and unlikely to succeed."  See here.

Courthouse News Service, Jurist and Reuters have more on the story.

Article on the use of public nuisance claims as product liability cases

Back in 2010 I posted a link to an article on the tort of "public nuisance" that stated:

The National Law Journal has published a short article on the tort of "public nuisance" interestingly called "The tort that refuses to die." Here is the first paragraph: "The tort of public nuisance has seen its fortunes rise and fall dramatically during the past several years. It was once hailed by the legal literati as the next big tort. More than one court described it as a monster threatening to devour tort law because of its propensity for reaching conduct that other tort theories could not. . . . Recent events confirm that analogy to a degree. Public nuisance resembles nothing so much as a zombie — a mindless creature perhaps not particularly dangerous at first glance but incredibly difficult to kill once and for all." The authors then discuss how the recent reversal of a case against former lead paint manufacturers alleging that lead paint was a public nuisance in Rhode Island, suggested public nuisance would not be an effective legal theory. But there have been many other cases that have challenged this conclusion. The article can be found here ..."

 I am bringing this up again today because I just read a new short article discussing the use of public nuisance claims related to opioid products, which starts as follows:  "Manufacturers are used to defending strict product liability actions when plaintiffs claim that their products are defective. But in the opioid litigation, plaintiffs have filed something else: more than 2,500 public nuisance cases so far."

The article is titled Trending in Tort Law: Transforming Product Liability Claims into Public Nuisance Actions and you can read it here.

Tennessee Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Damage Caps

Last week, in a 3-2 opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that the state's statute that caps noneconomic damages to $750,000 (in most cases) is not unconstitutional. 

Day on Torts has links to all the opinions here.