About a month ago I reported (here) that democrats in the Senate and House introduced companion bills
that would permit generic drug companies to update warning information
about the drugs they manufacture, a change that could allow patients to
sue the companies for failing to warn about the risks of taking their
drugs.
Today, About Lawsuits is reporting (here) that 41 state attorneys general have signed
onto the legislation, known as the “Patient Safety and Generic Labeling
Improvement Act” (S.2295). The National Association of Attorneys Genera
(NAAG) sent a letter of support (pdf) to Senator Leahy and Senator Al Franken, a co-sponsor, on May 11.
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Proposed new law would extend the statute of limitations in wrongful death cases in Washington DC
The Blog of the Legal Times is reporting that the
District of Columbia Council's Committee on the Judiciary is considering a proposed bill that would extend the statute of limitations to
file civil wrongful death lawsuits in Washington. It would change the time limit to file cases from one year to two years.
District Court finds Syria and Iran liable under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In an
opinion
published Monday, a federal district court judge found that Syria and Iran were liable to pay $332 million under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act for their role in a 2006 suicide attack in Israel that killed eleven people.
This is not that unusual - there are other cases that have imposed such liability before. But, unfortunately for the victims, the problem is that the judgements are usually impossible to collect. For more on that interesting topic, you can read Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2011 WL 3489109 (D. D.C. 2011).
This is not that unusual - there are other cases that have imposed such liability before. But, unfortunately for the victims, the problem is that the judgements are usually impossible to collect. For more on that interesting topic, you can read Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2011 WL 3489109 (D. D.C. 2011).
Update on New Hampshire's early offer proposal
I have been following (and commenting on) a proposed measure in New Hampshire to create an alternative to litigation based on "early offers." As I argued here and here, there are some good aspects to the proposal and some negative ones.
Now the TortsProf blog is reporting that the House version of the proposal has been amended. Under the Senate bill, if the claimant requested an early offer and then declined it, the claimant would have to prove gross negligence to a clear and convincing standard. In the House version, if the claimant requested an offer and then declined it, the claimant would have to pay the health care provider's attorney's fees if the claimant lost or recovered approximately the same amount of money that was in the early offer.
One problem I have with these proposals is that there is a lot incentive for the (and pressure on the) plaintiff to accept the offers, but little incentive for the defendant to make sure the offer is fair.
Or, am I missing something?
Now the TortsProf blog is reporting that the House version of the proposal has been amended. Under the Senate bill, if the claimant requested an early offer and then declined it, the claimant would have to prove gross negligence to a clear and convincing standard. In the House version, if the claimant requested an offer and then declined it, the claimant would have to pay the health care provider's attorney's fees if the claimant lost or recovered approximately the same amount of money that was in the early offer.
One problem I have with these proposals is that there is a lot incentive for the (and pressure on the) plaintiff to accept the offers, but little incentive for the defendant to make sure the offer is fair.
Or, am I missing something?
Medical malpractice reform bill in Michigan would completely alter generally accepted notions of med mal law
The Pop-Tort published a short report recently on attempts in Michigan to radically alter the law of medical malpractice. See here, and make sure to click on the links they provide for more background information.
According to one source, Senate Bill 1116 states that a defendant would not be liable in “an action alleging medical malpractice if the person’s conduct at issue constituted the exercise of professional judgment." As stated there is nothing new here. That statement is a generally accepted principle. But what it means, is distorted in the bill when it continues to say that "[a] person exercises professional judgment if the person acts with a reasonable and good-faith belief that the person’s conduct is both well founded in medicine and in the best interests of the patient.”
This statement is contrary to generally accepted principles of tort law. It makes the standard of care subjective. According to this proposed standard, the doctor is not negligent if the doctor can convince others that he really thought he was not being negligent. How self serving is that?!
The proper standard is that the plaintiff has the burden to show what the standard in the profession is and that the doctor acted below that standard. If the accepted standard in the profession allows for discretion, the doctor will not be found negligent as long as the doctor exercised that discretion using reasonable care. The fact that the result of that exercise of discretion was an injury to the plaintiff does not mean the plaintiff has a right to recover nor that the doctor was negligent.
This current standard places the burden on the plaintiff (where it should be) and it is not an easy burden to meet (the way it should be). There is no reason to change it.
And in case you think that the drafters of the bill maybe just did not know the law, think again. After creating this new way out for a defendant, the Bill states that "[i]f the court determines … that the [defendant] … did not meet the burden of proving that the act or omission was an exercise of professional judgment, the question of whether the person failed to provide the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care is a question for the trier of fact to decide."
In other words, the Bill creates a way for the defendant to excuse their conduct, but if they can't do it, then the "old" rules of law would apply.
I hope for the sake of injured patients in Michigan that this bill is defeated.
According to one source, Senate Bill 1116 states that a defendant would not be liable in “an action alleging medical malpractice if the person’s conduct at issue constituted the exercise of professional judgment." As stated there is nothing new here. That statement is a generally accepted principle. But what it means, is distorted in the bill when it continues to say that "[a] person exercises professional judgment if the person acts with a reasonable and good-faith belief that the person’s conduct is both well founded in medicine and in the best interests of the patient.”
This statement is contrary to generally accepted principles of tort law. It makes the standard of care subjective. According to this proposed standard, the doctor is not negligent if the doctor can convince others that he really thought he was not being negligent. How self serving is that?!
The proper standard is that the plaintiff has the burden to show what the standard in the profession is and that the doctor acted below that standard. If the accepted standard in the profession allows for discretion, the doctor will not be found negligent as long as the doctor exercised that discretion using reasonable care. The fact that the result of that exercise of discretion was an injury to the plaintiff does not mean the plaintiff has a right to recover nor that the doctor was negligent.
This current standard places the burden on the plaintiff (where it should be) and it is not an easy burden to meet (the way it should be). There is no reason to change it.
And in case you think that the drafters of the bill maybe just did not know the law, think again. After creating this new way out for a defendant, the Bill states that "[i]f the court determines … that the [defendant] … did not meet the burden of proving that the act or omission was an exercise of professional judgment, the question of whether the person failed to provide the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care is a question for the trier of fact to decide."
In other words, the Bill creates a way for the defendant to excuse their conduct, but if they can't do it, then the "old" rules of law would apply.
I hope for the sake of injured patients in Michigan that this bill is defeated.
Report on medical malpractice reform in Pennsylvania states the obvious while failing to address the real issue
The Post-Gazette reports that the number of medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania has dropped 47% in the ten years since two reform measures took effect. This should not be surprising. In fact, it is obvious: I have said this before, if you enact measures to make it more difficult for people to exercise their right to sue, then fewer people will get to sue. Duh!
The question that should be asked is whether this is a good result for society, for injured patients, for people who want more affordable and safer health care. Unfortunately for tort reformers, the evidence shows that the only people who benefit from this are doctors - particularly negligent ones -and their insurance companies. The cost of health care does not go down, in many (although not all) cases the cost of malpractice insurance does not go down, and there is no evidence that the quality of care improves. Meanwhile the risk of injury remains the same, or may be higher.
Does tort reform reduce the number of medical malpractice claims? Yes, absolutely. Is that necessarily a good thing? I don't think so. The key is in the details of the reform; what it seeks to achieve and how it tries to do it. Simply saying that fewer cases is good, is useless as a point of analysis and a really bad start for defining social policy.
The question that should be asked is whether this is a good result for society, for injured patients, for people who want more affordable and safer health care. Unfortunately for tort reformers, the evidence shows that the only people who benefit from this are doctors - particularly negligent ones -and their insurance companies. The cost of health care does not go down, in many (although not all) cases the cost of malpractice insurance does not go down, and there is no evidence that the quality of care improves. Meanwhile the risk of injury remains the same, or may be higher.
Does tort reform reduce the number of medical malpractice claims? Yes, absolutely. Is that necessarily a good thing? I don't think so. The key is in the details of the reform; what it seeks to achieve and how it tries to do it. Simply saying that fewer cases is good, is useless as a point of analysis and a really bad start for defining social policy.
Medical malpractice news from Pennsylvania
Max Kennerly of the Trial and Litigation blog reports several interesting medical malpractice cases from Pennsylvania in which defendant lawyers or their clients have been sanctioned for improper conduct.
First, there is a comment on the difficulty plaintiffs face in finding doctors to testify as expert witnesses against other doctors and an account of the sanctions imposed on the attorney for a physician for an attempt to intimidate a witness (here).
Third, here is another account of sanctions against doctors and hospitals for improper conduct.
First, there is a comment on the difficulty plaintiffs face in finding doctors to testify as expert witnesses against other doctors and an account of the sanctions imposed on the attorney for a physician for an attempt to intimidate a witness (here).
Third, here is another account of sanctions against doctors and hospitals for improper conduct.
Annual report on dog bites
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
More on the article that debunks the argument that tort reform is needed to prevent doctor migration
A few days ago I wrote about a new article that debunks the argument by tort reformers that medical malpractice liability has a direct effect on physician migration. Today, the New York Personal Injury Law Blog offers a more detailed comment on it here.
Monday, May 7, 2012
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issues controversial opinion in generic drug case
Last week, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued an opinion in a case called Bartlett v. v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. recognizing a design defect claim in a case involving a generic drug. The defendants argued the claim was preempted. You can read the full opinion here.
What makes the case controversial is the question of whether the decision is contrary to the holding in PLIVA v Mensing, the US Supreme Court decision holding that inadequate warnings cases against generic drug manufacturers are preempted because federal law requires the warnings for generic drugs to be identical to those of branded drugs. Not surprisingly, the Drug and Device blog has taken the position that the opinion is simply wrong (although they use stronger language). You can read their comments here and here.
For previous posts on Mensing and related issues go here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
What makes the case controversial is the question of whether the decision is contrary to the holding in PLIVA v Mensing, the US Supreme Court decision holding that inadequate warnings cases against generic drug manufacturers are preempted because federal law requires the warnings for generic drugs to be identical to those of branded drugs. Not surprisingly, the Drug and Device blog has taken the position that the opinion is simply wrong (although they use stronger language). You can read their comments here and here.
For previous posts on Mensing and related issues go here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
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