California expands the notion of "present at the scene" and "a contemporaneous sensory observance" of an accident for purposes of a claim for emotional distress of a bystander

 You probably remember from law school the development of the law related to claims by bystanders for emotional distress at witnessing someone else suffer an injury.  It originated in California with the famous case of Dillon v. Legg in which a mother saw a car hit one of her daughters.  In that case, the mother was not within the so-called zone of danger and would not have recovered under the applicable doctrine at the time, but the court adopted a new approach to the question.  Under the new approach, a bystander outside the zone of danger could support a claim if she could show that she had a close personal relationship with the victim, that she had a contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident and that she was present at the scene of the accident.  

Since that case was decided, the new approach was slowly adopted by a small majority of jurisdictions and law professors like me have explored the different possible consequences of its application by creating hypos involving all sorts of complicated scenarios.  In one of my hypos, for example, I ask the students, what if the mother is watching a live TV broadcast of the Olympics when her daughter suffers an injury.

Some jurisdictions have also explored different variations of the scenario.  For example, some have decided cases explaining how this type of claim should be decided if the plaintiff is away from the scene of the accident and only hears about it from someone else who witnesses it, or if the plaintiff does not see the accident, but sees its aftermath, or if the plaintiff does not see the accident but hears it, and so on.

I am writing about this today because I just saw an article in the ABA Journal reporting that a new case in California has finally decided one of the typical law school hypos:  what if the plaintiff is not at the scene but has a contemporaneous sensory observance of it by "technology."  

In this new case, the court held that a mother who heard her daughter’s car crash while giving her directions by cellphone has a right to recover.  The case is called Downey v City of Riverside, and you can read it here.

In my opinion, the decision is not surprising.  Granted the plaintiff was not "present at the scene" as originally required by Dillon v Legg, but I always thought that the element of having a contemporaneous sensory observance would become more important if the technology involved could at least provide some support for a feeling of "presence" at the scene.  In the end, however, it seems that the trajectory of the doctrine is heading toward minimizing the need for presence at the scene as long as the element of a contemporaneous sensory observance is strong.

As always, it is interesting to see how the common law expands and contracts as time goes on and it will be interesting to see where the courts go from here.

Trial related to destroyed frozen embryos raises interesting questions -- UPDATED again

This story is updated below, at the end of the original post

I just read a story on Courthouse News on a trial in which the plaintiffs are suing the manufacturer of cryogenic tanks that somehow failed causing the destruction of thousands of frozen eggs and embryos, which according to the plaintiffs dashed some families’ only hope of having biological children.

The plaintiffs' claim is for product liability based on the alleged defective design of the tanks.  The defendant, however, is apparently going to argue that the tank's failure was due to the misuse of the product by the Fertility Center which used it.  This is the first interesting point in the case because that argument is essentially claiming that the conduct of the Fertility Clinic was an unforeseeable intervening (and therefore superseding) cause.  

Yet, the most interesting question raised by this case relates to the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs.  The story states that the claims "for the loss of eggs and embryos" were sent to private arbitration.

So, my first question is what is a claim for the "loss of" the eggs and embryos?   I am assuming "embryos" refers to fertilized eggs, while eggs are not fertilized.  If that is the case, there can be no claim for wrongful death for the loss of the eggs in any jurisdiction I know of.  And for the loss of the embryos, there can be a wrongful death claim only in jurisdictions that recognize that life begins at conception for purposes of the wrongful death act.  So I wonder if the claim is not for wrongful death but for something else?  Is it just a contracts dispute then?  I just don' know.

On the other hand, maybe the claim is for emotional distress, but that claim would depend on the jurisdiction's approach to those claims?  If the jurisdiction requires impact, I don't think there is support for the claim, for example.  Also, the facts don't seem to fit a claim for emotional distress of a bystander.  

Since the case is already at trial, I guess these questions were resolved already through motions to dismiss, etc.  But I wonder what the answers are.  

UPDATE May 30, 2021:  Courthouse News is following the trial closely.  This week they published the following stories:

On May 26:  Lab Workers Were ‘Devastated’ by Tank Failure That Destroyed Human Embryos

On May 27:  Tank Manufacturer Accuses Fertility Clinic of Falsifying Data in Frozen Eggs Trial 

June 6: Fertility Patients Describe Sadness and Anger After Freezer Tank Failure

June 9: Jurors Asked to Award $30 Million for Lost Eggs and Embryos

June 10: Jury Finds Tank Maker Responsible for Lost Eggs and Embryos, Awards $15 Million

June 12: Loss of Embryos and Eggs at Fertility Clinic Leads to Groundbreaking Multi-Million Dollar Verdict in California

June 20: $15 Million Verdict Against IVF Cryopreservation Tank Maker Is Big News

New York expands category of people who can recover for emotional distress from witnessing someone else's accident

As you probably know, in most jurisdictions a plaintiff has a cause of action for emotional distress based on having witnessed someone else suffer an injury even if the plaintiff is outside the zone of danger (within which the plaintiff would be in danger of physical injury) if certain conditions are met. 

New York, however, is not one of those jurisdictions.  Instead, New York still follows the minority approach.  Thus, in NY, plaintiffs seeking to recover for emotional distress from witnessing someone else’s accident must show that they (the plaintiffs) were within the zone of danger and in danger of physical injury at the time of the accident and that the person who suffered the injury must have been an “immediate family member.”

I am writing about this today because about two weeks ago, the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state) expanded the category of people who can recover by recognizing that grandparents are “immediate family members.”  

It should be clear that the opinion did NOT extend the reach of possible liability to people outside the zone of danger, but it did expand the category of people who can recover if they are within the zone of danger.

The case is called Greene v. Esplanade Venture Partnership.  You can read the opinion here.  Courthouse News and the ABA Journal have more information about the case here and here respectively.

Alaska reiterates its approach to bystander emotional distress claims, which is very different than the one used in most other jurisdictions

As you probably know, back in 1968 the California Supreme Court created what has now become the majority approach to claims by people who suffer emotional distress at witnessing injuries suffered by others.  According to that approach, the claim is limited to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim, are present at the scene of the accident and who have a contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident.  Someone who is told about an accident after it happens or who arrives at the scene only to observe the aftermath, would not have a claim.

Alaska, however, never adopted the requirement of the contemporaneous sensory observance.  According to this approach, the plaintiff can support a claim as long as he or she is a close relative of the victim and that, under the circumstances, it is reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress.  This means the notion of duty in Alaska in these types of cases is broader and defendants are exposed to liability in many more cases.

I am writing about this today because I just read that the Alaska Supreme Court has again reiterated its approach to this issue in a new case called Doan v. Banner Health, Inc., (available in Westlaw at 2019 WL 2312537).

In this case, a mother, who was in a hospital waiting room when her daughter died, brought a NIED claim against medical providers for the distress she suffered upon seeing her daughter’s body. 

This claim would have been rejected in any state that follows the California approach and, obviously, in all states that reject it in favor of the "zone of danger" approach.  To my knowledge, this leaves only Alaska and Puerto Rico.

Thanks to the TortsProf blog for the update.