Last month the Supreme Court of the State of Washington heard oral arguments in a case called Volk v. DeMeerleer which raises the issue of whether doctors have a duty to warn “all foreseeable victims” of potentially dangerous patients in their care. In the case, a psychiatrist was sued after one of his patients shot and killed an ex-girlfriend and her son before killing himself. The trial court dismissed the complaint (on summary judgment) on the grounds that the doctor did not have a duty because the patient haad made no specific threats the victims during his treatment. The appeals court reversed (with one judge dissenting), however, holding that the plaintiff could support a cause of action because the patient's conduct was foreseeable and holding that "a question of fact exists as to whether Dr. Howard Ashby and his employer, Spokane Psychiatric Clinic, P.S., owed a duty to protect the general public, including plaintiffs, from violent behavior of patient Jan DeMeerleer." You can read the full appeals court's opinion here.
Leaving aside the fact that this is an odd ruling because the question of whether there is a duty is usually thought of as a question for the court, not the jury, the issue before the court is very interesting. It calls for the court to expand on the doctrine created by Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, which I am sure you are familiar with. In that case, the California Supreme Court held that a therapist does have a duty to protect an identifiable victim. The plaintiffs in Volk are asking the court to extend this notion further because the victims were not identifiable. The plaintiffs are asking for a duty to "protect the general public."
Tarasoff is a well known case, and a popular one, but it has been rejected by a number jurisdictions. Also, back in 1979 the Washington Court of Appeals decided a case in which it refused to expand the reach of the Tarasoff doctrine in a case where the victim already knew of the possible threat to her safety. (Interestingly, that case involved a lawyer, rather than a therapist) who arguably had confidential information about a client's intent to harm someone else.) For these reasons, it would not be entirely surprising if the Washington Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals. Yet, it will be very interesting to see what happens.
A finding for the plaintiff will have serious implications for the medical profession, and potentially for the legal profession too, because such a ruling will affect the principle of confidentiality. It is because of the importance of confidentiality that courts have either rejected Tarasoff or refused to expand its reach. Take a look at Thapar v Zezulka, 994 SW2d 635 (Tex 1999) (medical profession) and Hawkins v. King Cty. Dept. of Rehabilitative Services, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (legal profession).
The New York Times published an Op-Ed piece on this case written by a doctor in which he argues the court should reject the plaintiffs' claim and protect the value of confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship. You can read it here. The argument is a good one, although the author makes a horrible mistake in his analysis when he illustrates his duty of confidentiality by telling a story of a time when he destroyed illegal drugs handed to him by a patient in order to help the patient avoid arrest. In doing so, the doctor was not protecting the patient's confidentiality but, at helping someone destroy evidence of a crime; but I suppose that is another story. (The article generated two letters to the editor, one of which points out this issue.)
On the question of a possible duty in tort, I do agree the court should rule for the defendant. Even if the duty recognized in Tarasoff applies in the jurisdiction, a duty to warn the general public when there is no indication of specific plans or specific possible victims is too broad.